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THE RELIGION OF RACE:  
THE SUPREME COURT AS PRIESTS OF RACIAL POLITICS 
 
Audra L. Savage* 
 
Abstract 
The tumultuous summer of 2020 opened the eyes of many Americans, 
leading to a general consensus on one issue—racism still exists. This 
Article offers a new descriptive account of America’s history that can 
contextualize the zeitgeist of racial politics. It argues that the Founding 
Fathers created a national civil religion based on racism when they 
compromised on the issue of slavery in the creation of the Constitution. 
This religion, called the Religion of Race, is built on a belief system where 
whiteness is sacred and Blackness is profane. The sacred text is the 
Constitution, and it is interpreted by the Supreme Court who uses the 
adjudication of cases as a ritual to advance this religion.  
This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments and 
attendant Civil Rights Acts can best be understood as an attempt by 
Congress to end this Religion of Race and put all citizens on a path to 
equality. The Supreme Court resisted this attempt, however, as evidenced 
by cases adjudicated immediately following the Reconstruction period. 
Thus, a contest ensued that has shaped American racial politics ever 
since—whether the Supreme Court is interpreting the Constitution of 
Slavery or the Constitution of Reconstruction and, therefore, whether it 




The summer of 2020 ushered in a national reckoning on race and racism 
unparalleled in recent history. The protests and uprisings in the wake of the murder 
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of George Floyd1 exposed the wounds of a troubled American history that refuses to 
heal. More than ever before, people are questioning core democratic institutions and 
traditions as they relate to race. A national conversation about the nature and role of 
law enforcement, and its history rooted in slavery, began in earnest. There was 
confusion over which Independence Day to celebrate—Juneteenth or the Fourth of 
July. Monuments that at one time seemed permanent and immovable came tumbling 
down, as they were seen as odes to white supremacy and no longer acceptable. As 
the presidential election loomed large, there was an increased understanding of the 
history of the Electoral College—also rooted in slavery—and a debate over its 
continued use, as well as forceful calls to reenact key provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 to protect against voter suppression. At the heart of this questioning, 
and these (louder) calls for justice is one undeniable fact: racism still exists. 
Racism in the United States harks back to the arrival of Africans in colonial 
America and was integral in the founding of the nation.2 The Founding Fathers 
compromised on the issue of slavery in the creation of the Constitution and, by doing 
so, established the custom and tradition of subordinating Black people3 in American 
law and society. Following the end of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress 
focused on ending the “peculiar institution” and instituted constitutional 
amendments and civil rights acts to end the vestiges of slavery and advance 
citizenship rights and equal status of Blacks.4 In this sense, Congress attempted to 
unwind the original Constitution’s racial subordination and promote a new goal of 
equality.  
This Article offers a new descriptive account of America’s racial history that 
can helpfully highlight aspects of that history and contextualize the zeitgeist of racial 
understanding and politics. It argues that the subordination of Black people instituted 
by the Founders is more than just a notable consideration or an inquiry into the 
country’s political commitments. Instead, the racism established by the Constitution 
is an ideology—a set of basic beliefs and values—woven into the very soul of the 
country by that foundational document. Indeed, the Founding Fathers created a 
national civil religion based on racism when they compromised on the issue of 
slavery. This religion, which I call the Religion of Race, is built on a belief system 
 
1 Verdict, Count I–III, Minnesota v. Derek Michael Chauvin, (2021) (No. 27-CR-20-
12646). 
2 See Audra L. Savage, Defining the True Meaning of Racism: The Law & Religion of 
Colonial America, Parts I–III, CANOPY F. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://canopyforum.org/2020/03 
/23/defining-the-true-meaning-of-racism-the-law-and-religion-of-colonial-america-part-1/ 
[https://perma.cc/V8A9-JCA4] (exploring the impact of law and Christianity on the 
development of race and racism in colonial America). 
3 I adopt the custom of capitalizing “Blacks” and “Black Americans” to denote them as 
a separate racial group, as articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw. See Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). 
4 The African American Odyssey: A Quest for Full Citizenship, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/african-american-odyssey/reconstruction.html [https://perma. 
cc/5T86-YKDU] (last visited May 11, 2021).  
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in which whiteness is sacred, and Blackness is profane. The sacred text is the 
Constitution, and it is interpreted by the Supreme Court who uses the adjudication 
of cases as a ritual to advance this religion.  
This Article argues that the Reconstruction Amendments and attendant Civil 
Rights Acts can best be understood as an attempt by Congress to end this Religion 
of Race and remove the boundary between whites and Blacks. However, this attempt 
was resisted by the Supreme Court in the cases adjudicated immediately following 
the Reconstruction period—notably The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 and Plessy v. 
Ferguson of 1896. The Court’s decisions introduced a conflict that has shaped 
American racial politics ever since—whether the Supreme Court is interpreting the 
Constitution of Slavery or the Constitution of Reconstruction, and, therefore, 
whether it will perpetuate or dismantle the Religion of Race. 
This Article contributes to the field of Critical Race Theory by looking at the 
dynamic of power and subordination of Black people through the lens of a 
constitutionally established national civil religion built on racism.5 Critical Race 
Theory is an area of legal scholarship directly examining and assessing the law’s 
subordination of Black bodies and Black rights under the power of white privilege.6 
Developing from the Critical Legal Studies movement around forty years ago, 
Critical Race Theory questions whether the law is truly neutral and objective, 
especially as it relates to race.7 It looks at ways in which race may, in fact, distort 
legal doctrine and how law and legal traditions impact people of color—not as 
individuals but as members of a group. By advancing the argument that the racism 
established by the Founders is a national civil religion, this Article provides a new 
narrative in the vein of Critical Race Theory about racial subordination and the 
seemingly inexplicable inability of the law to fully eradicate racism in America.  
 
5 This work focuses on the racism against Black Americans. This is not to ignore the 
ugly history of racism against Native Americans, nor to deny their current plight that results 
from that history. I believe that the enslavement of Black Americans is this country’s greatest 
moral failing and is the reason why America has never truly met its potential. The words of 
Thurgood Marshall in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke are notable on this 
point: “The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, 
from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a 
whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.” 438 U.S. 265, 
400 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as 
Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2019) (“[A]rgu[ing] for a 
more inclusive paradigm that reaches beyond the black/white binary” and “highlight[ing] the 
centrality of federal Indian law . . .”). 
6 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Pelloer & Kendall Thomas eds., 
1996); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(2017); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic 
eds., 3d ed. 2013); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
(Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela Harris eds., 2002); and DOROTHY A. 
BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2014). 
7 DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 6, 
at 8–11. 
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The concept of a national civil religion describes the American experience of a 
democratic political community shaped by, and sometimes against, religious 
commitments and history. First postulated by French philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau,8 it was developed by sociologist Robert Bellah in his seminal work, “Civil 
Religion in America,” and in later works.9 Bellah argues that there is a “well-
institutionalized civil religion” operating in parallel with the confessional religion of 
the Christian church.10 There was never a state religion or a set of dogma for each 
citizen to follow.11 Instead, Bellah calls the expression of certain beliefs, symbols, 
and rituals of the American political reality the “American civil religion.”12 
Furthermore, these beliefs, symbols, and rituals are related to “sacred things” and 
are “institutionalized in a collectivity.”13 Although this religion is not Christianity, 
Bellah argues that it derives from Christianity and the Founding Fathers’ belief that 
the nation was directed by the will of a transcendent God, who held the ultimate 
sovereignty of the state.14 
According to Bellah, Americans believe there is a divine superstructure 
overarching the nation, which has destined the country for greatness. Gary 
Laderman expands on this idea about the centrality of God in the American civil 
religion.15 He explains that the combination of “myths, rituals, morality, God, and 
meaning” posited by Bellah drives American politics but operates under the public 
radar.16 In other words, this divine superstructure is the silent operating system for 
the nation. Turning the traditional notion of the separation between church and state 
upside down and inside out, Laderman suggests that the American civil religion 
“sheds a different light on the relationship between the sacred and the profane in the 
political arena.”17 
 
8 See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: OR, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHTS 202–21 (Rose M. Harrington trans., The Knickerbocker 
Press 1893) (1762) (introducing the term “civil religion” in his political musings). See 
generally ROBERT N. BELLAH, Rousseau on Society and the Individual, in THE ROBERT 
BELLAH READER 181–202 (Robert N. Bellah & Steven M. Tipton eds., 2006). 
9 ROBERT N. BELLAH, Civil Religion in America, in THE ROBERT BELLAH READER, 
supra note 8, at 225 [hereinafter BELLAH, Civil Religion]; ROBERT N. BELLAH, Religion and 
the Legitimation of the American Republic, in THE ROBERT BELLAH READER, supra note 8, 
at 246 [hereinafter BELLAH, Religion and the Legitimation]; and ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE 
BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL 4 (2d ed. 1992) 
[hereinafter BELLAH, BROKEN COVENANT]. 
10 BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 225. 
11 BELLAH, Religion and the Legitimation, supra note 9, at 248. 
12 BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 228. 
13 Id. at 233. 
14 Id. at 228, 232. 
15 See generally GARY LADERMAN, AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (2012) (analysis of civil 
religion as a force that continues to shape American society at the intersection of politics and 
religion). 
16 Id. at 26. 
17 Id. at 27. 
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A central feature of the civil religion is to serve as a tool of social solidarity. 
Laderman argues the following:  
 
[Civil religion] invigorates the social bonds uniting individual citizens into 
a common social group and providing them with a shared sense of purpose 
and meaning in the midst of historical experience and cultural diversity. 
These are two key functions of American civil religion: to unite and to 
orient.18  
 
For Bellah, American society is unified by citizens who agree to subordinate the 
nation to a set of ethical principles that transcend the nation itself.19  
This Article argues that beyond the idea of a transcendent G/god as the core of 
the American civil religion, race is the central, unifying, and orienting factor. Bellah 
believes that the civil religion exerts pressure on the populace to find a solution to 
the treatment of Black Americans, what he terms as “our greatest domestic 
problem.”20 This Article advances a theory contrary to this assertion. The historical 
treatment of Blacks is not a problem or issue. Instead, it is the core of American life 
and American law.21 The Founding Fathers positioned the American political 
structure along the axis of race—institutionalizing the ability of one group of people 
to dominate another group and use that other group to create wealth.  
When defining a national civil religion, both Robert Bellah and Gary Laderman 
draw upon the foundational work of Émile Durkheim, a French sociologist and 
leading founder of the field of sociology of religion.22 Durkheim’s contributions to 
the concept of American civil religion are threefold. First, “[h]e too was concerned 
with social structures and the question of collective coherence in modernity and 
modern nations. Like Rousseau, Durkheim understood religion as an integral 
ingredient for social solidarity. His definition of religion emphasized social realities 
over theological beliefs.”23 Second, Durkheim posited that the definition of religion 
contains two elements—the sacred and the profane.24 Further, and most importantly, 
Durkheim transitioned the idea of religion as something experienced by an 
individual as part of the collective into something experienced by the group.25 
 
18 Id. at 32. 
19 BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 226. 
20 Id. at 241. 
21 Bellah acknowledges the horrific treatment of Native Americans and Black 
Americans at the founding of the nation as America’s “double crime.” BELLAH, BROKEN 
COVENANT, supra note 9, at 37. See BELLAH, BROKEN COVENANT, supra note 9, at 36–60, 
for Bellah’s discussion on slavery in the American experience. 
22 See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO DURKHEIM (Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip 
Smith eds., 2005). See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH, Durkheim and Ritual, in THE BELLAH 
READER, supra note 8, at 150–80; LADERMAN, supra note 15, at 35–37. 
23 LADERMAN, supra note 15, at 35. 
24 Id. 
25 BELLAH, Civil Religion, supra note 9, at 225–26. 
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Durkheim’s construct is a useful analytical tool to describe the racial subordination 
of Blacks in the law, and this Article focuses on the core concepts of this construct. 
Part I describes the original Constitution as a proslavery compact by detailing 
the debate over slavery in the Constitutional Convention and the compromises made 
by the Founding Fathers, namely, the Three-Fifths Compromise, the Slave 
Importation Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause. It then details key considerations 
during the ratification process related to the status of Black people. I will call the 
Constitution that was produced by the Founding Fathers, the Constitution of Slavery. 
Using the construct of religion provided by Durkheim, Part II argues that the 
Founding Fathers established a national civil religion I call the Religion of Race. 
Each element of the Religion is described, including the authority (Constitution and 
Supreme Court), beliefs (whiteness as sacred, Blackness as profane), and ritual 
(adjudication of law). The section then illustrates the development of the Religion 
of Race by examining case law in the period after the Constitution was created and 
before the Civil War, including Grove, Prigg, Van Zandt, and Dred Scott. 
Part III presents the Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts as 
shining a new light on the equality of Blacks contrary to the previous dogma of the 
original Constitution. This new light I call the Constitution of Reconstruction. The 
section then argues that the Supreme Court incorrectly narrowed the Reconstruction 
Amendments and Acts and limited their application, leading to the unfulfilled 
promise of equality for Blacks by creating the doctrine of “separate but equal.”  
Part IV describes the promise of a new civil religion engendered by the 
Constitution of Reconstruction and how the Court and Congress denied that promise. 
The section then details the transition of the Religion of Race from a civil religion 
to a dis/civil religion by the Supreme Court when it adopted the doctrine of state 
action and sanctioned private discrimination.  
 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION OF SLAVERY 
 
Racism was a custom, a cultural tradition of society against Native Americans 
and Africans that took root on this continent in seventeenth-century British America. 
It existed for a century before the American republic was founded. The drafting of 
the U.S. Constitution did something new, however. It ensconced, encapsulated, and 
established the custom and tradition of racism into American law by the Founders.  
This section describes the debate over slavery in the Constitutional Convention 
and the compromises made by the Founding Fathers. It then details key 
considerations during the ratification process related to the status of Black 
Americans. 
 
A.  The Debate and Compromise over Slavery 
 
During the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth century, certain thinkers and 
writers, like John Locke and Thomas Paine, began positing the doctrine of inherent 
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human equality in American society.26 The idea of created equality was profoundly 
influential to American revolutionaries as they began to articulate their grievances 
against King George III.27 By his own testimony, Thomas Jefferson, in drafting the 
Declaration of Independence, “appropriated” the ideas espoused by Locke.28 Using 
these ideals, American colonists expressed the desire for freedom from a tyrannical 
British monarchy that continued to levy burdensome taxes and other heavy 
impositions on the colonists and did so without representation of the colonists in 
Parliament.29 Once revolutionary ideals began to foment, many started to question 
the legitimacy of slavery, especially as they were pressing for their freedom from 
the Crown.30 The Revolution brought a division over the morality of slavery.31 For 
some, it was further evidence of the evil of the monarchy. As revolutionaries, 
Americans engaged in self-scrutiny as they began to define who they were and 
whom they would become.32 Some wondered whether the nation would be cursed 
because of its hypocrisy for enslaving Africans while claiming that the nation was a 
land of liberty and equality.33 
The tension between revolutionary ideals and the morality of slavery is best 
exemplified by the varying thoughts and actions of the men who were instrumental 
in drafting the documents that defined the nation—from the Declaration of 
Independence to the Articles of Confederation to the U.S. Constitution. No two men 
held the same opinion on the morality of slavery and the question of emancipating 
American slaves.34 They held confused and often conflicting views on slavery.35 
 
26 THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 138–40 (2010). 
27 Prior to this time, the “doctrine of created inequality” was prevalent among the 
seventeenth-century elites of America and Europe. According to this prevalent belief, God 
created all humans to need God’s grace equally, but God made people in different stations 
and situations in life. Id. People were unequal in their different capabilities and roles in 
society. Id. at 132. The idea that all men [people] were created equal in value and talents was 
profound at the time. 
28 Id. at 139. 
29 See KIDD, supra note 26, at 140. 
30 Sally E. Hadden, The Fragmented Laws of Slavery in the Colonial and Revolutionary 
Eras, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: VOLUME 1 EARLY AMERICA 
(1580–1815) 275 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
31 Id. at 255. 
32 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO, 1550–1812 269–311 (2d ed. 2012). 
33 Id. 
34 See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 170–72 
(1966); KIDD, supra note 26, at 154–55. See also BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ADDRESS TO THE 
INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS IN AMERICA, UPON SLAVE-KEEPING (2d ed. 
1773). 
35 Any discussion of the confusing, and at times, contradictory stances of the Founding 
Fathers regarding slavery must begin with the ultimate scribe on equality—Thomas 
Jefferson. It is no understatement to suggest that Jefferson offered the most baffling view on, 
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This lack of consensus shaped the debate over the place of the institution in the new 
nation. 
With a wide set of attitudes regarding the morality, continued existence, and 
legality of slavery, delegates of the thirteen colonies met in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787 to transition the confederation of states into a lasting federal 
government.36 The debate among delegates at the Constitutional Convention was 
mostly between states interested in protecting the “peculiar institution” of slavery 
and states that wanted to abolish it, or at least limit the power of Southern states 
employing it.37 The result was a compromise that would ensure the longevity of 
slavery for decades following. 
Three key provisions of the Constitution directly protect, if not encourage, the 
institution of slavery. The “Three-Fifths Compromise” allowed Southern states to 
gain more political muscle by counting slaves in each state’s population, thereby 
 
and life experience with, slavery. Throughout his lifetime, Jefferson expressed beliefs that 
African slaves were innocent, inferior creatures whose enslavement should be avenged by 
the Patriots against the British, yet later, he stated that slaves were devoid of beauty, 
intelligence, or affection. They were worthy of serving as unpaid labor and concubinage, yet 
such treatment would be avenged by God. As severe as this wrath might be, however, it was 
of little or no concern to Jefferson, as he made very little effort to assuage God’s judgment 
by emancipating his own slaves (including his children). See Hadden, supra note 30, at 275; 
DAVIS, supra note 34, at 167–73; KIDD, supra note 26, at 146; Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Jean Nicolas Deméunier (June 26, 1786), in 10 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 63 (Julian 
Boyd ed., 1950); THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138–39 (William 
Peden ed., 2d ed. 1982). 
James Madison and Patrick Henry also held contradictory views on slavery. Each 
expressed moral repugnance and disgust at the institution and believed it was inconsistent 
with the liberty espoused by the new republic. Yet, they refused to repudiate it and 
emancipate their slaves, owing to their dependence on them and inability to live without 
them. See KENNETH MORGAN, SLAVERY IN AMERICA: A READER AND GUIDE 135 (2005); 
Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), in THE FOUNDERS ON 
RELIGION: A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 99–100 (James H. Hutson ed., 2009). 
One of the few Founders to emancipate his slaves was George Washington who, in his 
will, mandated their freedom following his wife’s death. Washington made antislavery 
professions but was cautious when lending his support to Quaker antislavery actions.  
Further, he was indignant when antislavery advocates sought to bring his slaves under the 
protection of Pennsylvania’s antislavery laws, and he sent his slaves back to Virginia to avoid 
their liberation. Despite his attempts to protect ownership of his property, Washington often 
wished to rid himself of the “very troublesome species of property” and eventually did so, 
but only upon his death. KIDD, supra note 26, at 155; Letter from George Washington to 
Alexander Spotswood (Nov. 23, 1794), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washing 
ton/05-17-02-0136 [https://perma.cc/T9EG-NCYV]. 
36 PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON 7 (1996) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS]. 
37 The phrase “peculiar institution” is attributed to Kenneth M. Stampp and his seminal 
work, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956). 
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gaining more representatives in the House of Representatives than would be the case 
if only whites were counted.38 This provision reads as follows: 
 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
states which may be included within this union, according to their 
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of 
years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.39  
 
Essentially, this provision mandates the counting of slaves—“all other persons”—
as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of determining the number of 
representatives and the taxes allotted to each state. Whites, even those who were 
indentured, will be counted as a whole; slaves as a specified fraction; and Native 
Americans not at all.  
No clause demonstrated the compromises on slavery more than Article I, 
Section 9, clause 1, related to the international slave trade. This “Slave Importation 
Clause” prevents Congress from ending the slave trade before 1808, although it does 
not require Congress to ban the slave trade after that date.40 This clause provides 
that:  
 
The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now 
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress 
prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty 
may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each 
person.41  
 
This provision is not self-enacting—the slave trade was not automatically terminated 
in 1808. Instead, Congress has to affirmatively create legislation to end the trade.42 
This provision is notable because it was a major exception to the general power 
granted to Congress to regulate commerce.43 
Article IV, Section 2, clause 3, the “Fugitive Slave Clause,” requires states to 
return runaway slaves to their owners on claim and prevents states from 
emancipating the slaves: 
 
No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation 
 
38 FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 7–18. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
40 FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 4. 
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
42 Congress terminated U.S. participation in the international slave trade in 1807, with 
the law taking effect on January 1, 1808. See JORDAN, supra note 32, at 7, 331. 
43 FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 4. 
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therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up 
on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.44  
 
This was a major win for the Southern states, as there had never been an affirmative 
duty of non-slave-owning states to return runaway slaves before this provision. The 
practice of capturing and returning runaway servants and slaves existed before the 
Constitutional Convention as agreements between the various colonies.45 It was a 
matter of comity among states.46 Now, all states were obligated to incur the cost of 
time and money in returning runaway slaves to their owners.47 
Two ancillary provisions are related to the three above. Article I, Section 9, 
clause 4, states that any capitation or direct tax must take into account the Three-
Fifths Compromise. If there should be any head tax, then slaves will count three-
fifths of whites. Article V prohibits any amendment to either the Slave Importation 
Clause or the capitation tax clauses before 1808. 
Other provisions of the Constitution indirectly support the institution of 
slavery.48 The Domestic Insurrections Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 15) 
allowed Congress to call the militia to “suppress insurrections,” which ostensibly 
included slave rebellions, and the federal government promised to protect states 
against “domestic violence,” including slave rebellions, in Article IV, Section 4. 
Certain provisions (Article I, Section 9, clause 5 and Article I, Section 10, clause 2) 
prohibited the federal government from excising taxes on goods imported or 
exported by any state. This prevented an indirect tax on goods produced from the 
fruits of slave labor, notably tobacco, rice, and cotton. Further, the Electoral College 
was created, in part, to ensure that the Southern states had voting rights equal to the 
North. As such, the same three-fifths formula used elsewhere in the Constitution was 
used in Article II, Section 1, clause 2, establishing the Electoral College. It gave 
whites in slave states disproportionate influence in the election of the President. 
 
44 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3. 
45 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA, 1760–1848 78 (1977). 
46 Id. 
47 See id. Slave patrols were a common feature of the peculiar institution, as they were 
assembled by plantation owners to patrol at night looking for slaves who were off-plantation 
and possibly attempting escape. These patrols gained more power and force under the 
auspices of the fugitive slave laws created pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Clause, and were 
the progenitors of the modern police force. See Eleanor Lumsden, How Much Is Police 
Brutality Costing America?, 40 UNIV. OF HAW. L. REV. 141, 146 (2017) (“Over time, these 
slave patrols eventually morphed into a form that is now recognized as modern-day law 
enforcement: ‘[t]he slave patrol, which began as an offshoot of the militia, and came to 
resemble the modern police, thus provides a transitional model in the development of 
policing.’ It can be argued that from the beginning, law enforcement existed to control, not 
protect, blacks. Further, as African-Americans were literal property, policing that returned 
runaway slaves to their masters directly served the purpose of maintaining white property 
interests.”) (footnote omitted). 
48 See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal 
Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1030–31 (1993). 
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Other clauses protecting slavery included the clause on the admission of new states 
(Article IV, Section 3, clause 1), which was drafted in anticipation of adding new 
slave states to the Union, and the clause on ratifying the Constitution (Article V), 
which was drafted to ensure that slaveholding states would have a perpetual veto 
over any constitutional changes.49 
 
B.  Ratification 
 
Drafting the Constitution was only the first part of the constitutional process. 
The second part required the delegates to return to their home states with the draft 
document and present it to their fellow citizens for ratification.50 It would take a year 
for the Constitution to be ratified by the required number of states.51 The debate 
notes, letters, pamphlets, and other writings during this time offer a deeper 
understanding of the meaning of the three major provisions regarding slavery and 
the perceived consequences of these provisions becoming law.52 Four major themes 
are prevalent in these documents. 
The most dominant theme is the status of slaves as both property and people, 
and, as property, their inclusion in the same category as plantation animals. For some 
delegates, the slave counted merely as property, and thus other property should be 
included in the count for representation and taxation purposes, or at least for taxation 
only.53 Other delegates noted that slaves are both property and persons under law.54 
The slave laws allowed the slave to be vendible as property while also protecting the 
slave against harm and preventing slaves from harming others as persons.55 This 
duality of character is bestowed by law, and, therefore, some believed it should be 
reflected in the Constitution.56 
Another theme regarding the place of Blacks in American society focused on 
the importance of a truly representative government. Some opposed the Three-Fifths 
 
49 FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 3–7. 
50 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying 
Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 457, 466–68 (2009). 
51 Id. 
52 See generally THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, VOLS. 2–4 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 2000), https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/help/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/BDM6-R2KF] (explaining the anthology “draw[s] on the writings of a 
wide array of people . . . . from the reflections of philosophers to popular pamphlets, from 
public debates in ratifying conventions to the private correspondence of the leading political 
actors of the day.”). 
53 See Letter from a Gentleman from Massachusetts (Oct. 17, 1787), in 2 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 114 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION]. 
54 See James Madison, Federalist, No. 54 (Feb. 12, 1788), in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 126. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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Compromise because of the lack of rights granted to slaves in order for them to 
participate in government.57 
The third theme centered on the tension between a new nation founded upon 
the ideals of liberty and equality and the creation of a constitution sanctioning human 
bondage. The tension was based either on political views about America as a nation 
of equality58 or religious views about America as God’s nation.59  
The fourth theme arising in the debates concerned the slave trade and confusion 
over the place of slavery in the nation. Some assumed that the trade would be 
prohibited once the twenty-year ban expired because slavery was a failing institution 
whose demise had already begun.60 Others, however, felt that Americans would 
never give up their slaves, and thus Congress would not enact a ban once it was 
permitted to do so.61 The debate also showed a nascent states’ rights argument for 
the continuation of slavery.62 By drafting this provision in the manner they chose, 
the Founders did not answer whether there should be a ban on the slave trade as part 
 
57 See Brutus, No. 3 (Nov. 15, 1787), in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 
53, at 115; Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 53, at 120; see also A Republican Federalist, No. 5 (Jan. 19, 1788), in 2 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 126. 
58 See Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 292 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION]; Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution (Fall 
1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION. at 282; Luther Martin, Genuine Information 
(1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 285; Debate in MA Ratifying Convention 
(Jan. 18, 25–26, 30, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 288. 
59 See A Countryman (Dec. 13, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 
58, at 284; Joshua Atherton, New Hampshire Ratifying Convention (1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 286; Luther Martin, Genuine Information 
(1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 285. But see Debate in 
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 17–19, 1788) [Elliot], in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 288; James Madison, Federalist, No. 42 (Jan. 22, 1788), 
in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 289; and Debate in South Carolina 
House of Representatives (Jan. 16–17, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 58, at 287 (rejecting the idea that slavery is against God’s will). 
60 See Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 17–19, 1788) [Elliot], in 2 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 123; James Madison, Federalist, No. 42 
(Jan. 22, 1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 289; and Debate in 
VA Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 58, at 292. 
61 See Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 286; Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 
1788) [Elliot], in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 292–94. 
62 See Debate in South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16–17, 1788) [Elliot], 
in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 287, and A Federal Republican (Oct. 
28, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 282. 
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of the ideals of the country as embedded in the Constitution. Instead, they deferred 
the conflict to the future for others to resolve.63 
Ultimately, the advocates in favor of the three provisions regarding slavery had 
the winning argument, and the Constitution was ratified as drafted. The Founders 
compromised on various issues regarding slavery, and in the end, the Constitution 
was a proslavery compact.64 
Lawrence M. Friedman says a constitution is generally “in essence a frame, a 
skeleton, an outline of the form of government; it mostly held its tongue on 
specifics.”65 Perhaps the Constitution did not give many specifics, but it did not hold 
its tongue on slavery. That lack of restraint established several principles of racist 
attitudes toward Black people in this country. The Constitution could have been 
silent on the matter of slavery and let custom and tradition be the arbiter of how and 
in which state it continued. Writing it into the legal document, however, sealed the 
country’s understanding of Blacks and legitimated racist attitudes. Race became one 
of the core features of how the new nation defined itself. For this reason, I call the 
Constitution the Constitution of Slavery. 
The next section details the effect of the Founders’ compromise on slavery and 
argues that the Founders established racist beliefs towards Blacks into something 
more than a social phenomenon. They established racism as the national civil 
religion. 
 
II.  THE RELIGION OF RACE 
 
A.  Defining the Religion 
 
The Constitution contains the Founders’ understanding and experience of law 
and custom as they had developed over two centuries of early American life. The 
words reflect their thoughts and ideas about certain concepts. Their individual 
experiences are incorporated. When constitutional scholars debate the legitimacy of 
certain ideals and principles based on whether they are in accordance with the 
original intent of the Founders, they are probing the public understanding of laws 
and words in eighteenth-century America to better understand the application of the 
constitutional provision to modern law. The underlying assumption is that the words 
have value, and that value continues to endure. This means that the impressions of 
the Founders continue to have a lasting impact. 
In addition to probing into the thoughts and actions of the Founders to consider 
the meaning of the words and concepts in the Constitution, one need only review the 
words in the Constitution itself to fully understand what the Founders hoped to 
 
63 A Federal Republican (Oct. 28, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 58, at 282–94. 
64 See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 31–33; see also 
Paul Finkelman, Lincoln v. the Proslavery Constitution: How a Railroad Lawyer’s 
Constitutional Theory Made Him the Great Emancipator, 47 ST. MARY’S L. J. 63, 67 (2015) 
[hereinafter Finkelman, Lincoln v. the Proslavery Constitution]. 
65 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 103 (2005). 
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achieve. The Constitution was meant to be the best possible way to develop a society 
of people united in the pursuit of justice and promoting their best welfare. According 
to the Preamble, the provisions of the Constitution ensure the most attainable version 
of liberty. The Founders’ version of liberty and justice, however, contained 
provisions regarding the enslavement of a whole class of people—Black people. By 
drafting the provisions of the Constitution regarding slavery in the manner they did, 
the Founders fixed the practice of slavery into American culture and created guiding 
principles for how the country would think of Blacks, not only then but now.  
Religion is a mechanism for ordering one’s life and deciphering the ultimate 
meaning of life. The Founders ordered American life in a very specific way when 
creating the Constitution. Sanford Levinson observes, “the public rhetoric of 
American political culture remains organized, in substantial ways, as a faith 
community centered on the Constitution . . . .”66 He continues by saying that the 
American civil religion is a “web of understandings, myths, symbols, and documents 
out of which would be woven interpretive narratives both placing within history and 
normatively justifying the . . . American community . . . .”67 Racism is the core 
narrative defining the civil religion. This ordering of life in the U.S., where race is a 
distinguishing fact that privileges white people by denigrating Black people, is 
America’s true national religion. 
The Religion of Race is the American civil religion. In this religion, whiteness 
is sacred, and Blackness is profane. Following in the footsteps of Bellah and 
Laderman,68 I use the work of Émile Durkheim to describe the Religion of Race and 
its development as America’s true civil religion. 
Durkheim provided the following construct for religion: 
 
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices 
which unite in one single moral community called a Church, all those who 
adhere to them . . . religion must be an eminently collective thing.69 
 
Religion, then, has three main components: (1) authority that defines the sacred and 
provides directives for religious practices; (2) beliefs about the sacred and the 
profane; and (3) rituals as ceremonies that elevate the sacred and reinforce a 
worldview for the believers.70 The Religion of Race comprises these components, 
which are described in detail below.71 
  
 
66 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 52 (2011). 
67 Id. at 10. 
68 See supra Introduction. 
69 ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 44–47 (Karen E. 
Fields trans., 1995). 
70 See id. at 34–44. 
71 Id.; see supra Introduction for Bellah and Laderman’s use of this construct. 
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1.  Authority 
 
Authority is a necessary component of religion. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
suggests that religious belief is more than mere observation of everyday 
experiences.72 Instead, it is a “prior acceptance of authority which transforms” the 
everyday experience.73 This authority, which can reside in texts or people, defines 
what is to be worshiped as sacred and then defines the religious practices related to 
the sacred. As such, rituals can be performed only by “consecrated personages.”74 
“There are words, phrases, and formulas that can be said only by consecrated 
personages; there are gestures and movements that cannot be executed by just 
anyone.”75 They are executed by those chosen by the group to have persuasive 
authority. The authority of the Religion of Race resides in a sacred text, the 
Constitution, and consecrated people, the Supreme Court.76 Both forms of authority 
are discussed below. 
 
(a)  Authority of Text—The Constitution 
 
The leading authority for the Religion of Race is the Constitution. As the oldest 
operating constitution in the world, the American Constitution has been venerated 
as a sacred document since its creation. According to President Woodrow Wilson, 
the Constitution became the object of “blind worship” almost instantly.77 Bellah 
refers to the Constitution (as well as the Declaration of Independence) as “sacred 
scriptures.”78 The original copy of the Constitution is housed in the National 
Archives in what is called the “Shrine.”79 More important, early in the country’s 
history, the Supreme Court referred to it as “sacred.”80 There is universal acceptance 
of the Constitution as the authority for the rule of law in this country. 
As important as it is for external sources to refer to its authority, the reasons the 
Constitution is the persuasive authority of the Religion of Race are inherent in the 
 
72 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 109–12 
(1973). 
73 Id. 
74 DURKHEIM, supra note 69, at 35. 
75 Id. 
76 It is possible for authority to reside in extralegal sources, such as academics, activists, 
businesses, or others who shape law and policy. I will explore this type of authority in future 
work. 
77 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 198 (1963) (quoting Woodrow Wilson). 
78 ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONAL 
WORLD 176 (1991) [hereinafter BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF]. See also Thomas C. Grey, The 
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1984). 
79 PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE ix (1st ed. 1997). 
80 See Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. 296, 307 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting) 
(“regarded . . . as the sacred authority of the Constitution”); Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 
100 U.S. 514, 529 (1879) (“Contracts under the Constitution are as sacred as the Constitution 
that protects them from infraction . . .”). 
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nature of the Constitution itself. As a self-proclaimed compact among the people, it 
replaced the God of the Declaration of Independence with the god of the demos. The 
Declaration announced the colonies’ formal separation from the king of Great 
Britain and their intent to govern themselves, all under the auspices of divine 
direction and guidance.81 Bellah notes that there are four references to God in the 
Declaration, including the famous (and at times infamous) statement that all men 
“are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”82 Jefferson calls upon higher law to 
legitimate the separation and creation of a new nation.83 The Declaration also 
includes references to the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”; “the Supreme 
Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intentions”; and “a firm reliance on the 
protection of divine Providence.”84 This direct appeal to divine providence and 
guidance was not repeated in the Constitution, which was drafted just eleven years 
later.85 Instead, the Constitutions states,  
 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defence [sic], promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.86 
 
Clearly, it is the “people” who ordain the creation of this document to form the union 
of the states and provide for its security going forward. Unlike the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution does not claim any transcendent spiritual authority 
higher than itself.87 This is significant, as the Declaration was backward-looking in 
its termination of the rule of the previous regime, whereas the Constitution was 
forward-looking with the objective of establishing principles to guide the new 
nation.88 These principles would be determined by the people. In this way, the 
Constitution was an agreement among the people—a true social compact. Robert 
Cover suggests that its status as a Lockean social contract is why the Constitution 
elicited such fidelity from the men of the 1780s and 1790s.89 
 
81 See KIDD, supra note 26, at 75–96. 
82 BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF, supra note 78, at 174. 
83 Id. 
84 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 5 (U.S. 1776). 
85 The appeal to the equal status of men proved troublesome for the slave societies of 
the South, as slaves and abolitionists began using the language of the Declaration in their 
rebellion against the peculiar institution. See infra Part III.A. (discussing the influence of 
abolitionists’ belief in natural law rights (that is, equality) for slaves on the drafting of the 
Reconstruction Amendments). 
86 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
87 BELLAH, BROKEN COVENANT, supra note 9, at 4. 
88 MAIER, supra note 79, at 192. 
89 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
28 (1975). 
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The Constitution is the moral authority of the nation. Bellah likens the founding 
of the nation to the Israelites search for the Promised Land.90 Extending the 
metaphor, the Constitution represents a moral commitment of the covenant people 
to order their lives by the highest standards.91 Cover suggests that its moral authority 
transcends its status as the supreme law of the land. Its authority arises from the very 
origins of the Constitution and its utility as a real social compact brought to life for 
the first time.92 People adhere to its rules because it sets forth a government without 
coercion, where men have come to mutually depend on that agreement.93 There is 
no king or pope using power and the threat of violence to command obedience. 
Instead, it is just the people contracting among themselves, and thus they have a 
moral obligation to obey their mutual agreement.94 
The Constitution is a sacred text not only because it has moral authority as a 
social compact but also because it speaks to its importance as the preeminent guide 
for the nation. Clause 2 of Article VI, referred to as the Supremacy Clause, states 
the following: 
 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.95 
 
The Constitution enumerates certain powers and rights for the branches of 
government, the states, and the people. By declaring itself the “supreme Law of the 
Land,” it explicitly places itself above any other laws or rules. This is confirmed by 
the Tenth Amendment, which notes that any power not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution is reserved to the states or to the people.96 While ensuring 
state sovereignty, this amendment supports the supremacy of the Constitution—the 
first inquiry is always whether the Constitution addresses a particular power or law; 
if not, then state law has authority. 
The use of the word “supreme” is significant. A universal etymological English 
dictionary in use in the eighteenth century defines “supreme” as “advanced to the 
highest Degree of Authority or Dignity,” and “supremacy” as “the most transcendent 
Height of Power and Authority, more especially the Supreme or chief power of the 
King or Queen of England, in Ecclesiastical Affairs.”97 The religious aspect of this 
 
90 BELLAH, BROKEN COVENANT, supra note 9, at 36–60. 
91 Id. at 62. 
92 COVER, supra note 89, at 132–33. 
93 Id. at 134. 
94 Id. at 151. 
95 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
97 NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
https://archive.org/details/universaletymolo00bail [https://perma.cc/QU48-LFXW] (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2020). 
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word is demonstrated in the Declaration of Independence when the colonists appeal 
for assistance to the “Supreme Judge of the world” (meaning God).98 By declaring 
itself to be the “supreme Law of the Land,” the Constitution declares that it is equal 
to God as the highest authority for guidance and direction. 
The acceptance of this authority was consecrated by the ratification process, 
through which the people agreed that the Constitution would be the highest moral 
authority for the new nation. Through that process, “the people” were able to debate 
and understand the meaning of the provisions.99 It took a year of meetings, pamphlet 
publications, and fierce exchange among the populace before the Constitution was 
accepted by the required number of states.100 It was also quickly amended by the 
addition of the Bill of Rights, further safeguarding individual liberties.101 This time 
of ratification and amending was a trial by fire, ensuring that the social compact met 
the needs of the new nation.  
 
(b)  Authority of People—The Supreme Court 
 
Judges and the Supreme Court are consecrated personages in the Religion of 
Race. According to Article III of the Constitution, judicial power is vested in one 
“supreme court” and such inferior courts as needed, as ordained and established by 
Congress.102 The courts will have judges exhibiting good behavior with 
compensation for their services.103 Article III establishes two things. First, there will 
be a hierarchy of courts, with a bottom-rung consisting of courts of first appearance 
followed by a higher-level Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the only final 
tribunal for controversies and challenges under the Constitution.104 Whether it 
decides cases under original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction, the decisions of 
the Supreme Court are the final word on a particular matter. There is no higher 
appeal. Second, judges are the chosen people to interpret and explain the 
Constitution. Like priests, they spend years studying the sacred text and are called 
upon to provide exegesis105 on its ultimate meaning. Judges, and the lawyers arguing 
 
98 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 84, at para. 5. See also Eugene 
Volokh, The Declaration of Independence and God, WASH. POST (July 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/05/the-declaration-
of-independence-and-god/ [https://perma.cc/39H9-XC8F]. 
99 See supra Part I. 
100 See Maggs, supra note 50, at 467–76. 
101 See Saul Cornell & Gerald Leonard, The Consolidation of the Early Federal System, 
1791–1812, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: VOLUME I EARLY 
AMERICA (1580–1815), supra note 30, at 518, 522. 
102 U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
103 Id. 
104 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (holding that the Supreme Court of 
the United States overruled the courts of the states). 
105 See Christopher Rowland, Biblical Exegesis: Christian Views, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
RELIGION 870–78 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005) (defining “biblical exegesis” as involving 
“the interpretation, explanation, and exposition of the Bible’s various books, in relation either 
to the time of their composition, or to their meanings for readers in subsequent centuries”). 
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the cases before the Court, have the authority and responsibility to preserve the 
sanctity of the venerated document. 
The supremacy and finality of the Supreme Court were confirmed relatively 
soon after the creation of the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison.106 In that decision, 
the Court said the principles established by the people in the Constitution are 
fundamental and the supreme authority.107 One such principle was the creation of 
different departments of the government, one of them being the judiciary. It is the 
“province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”108 In doing so, 
the Court must be cognizant that “the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of 
the legislature. . . .”109 The Court acknowledged that the Constitution declares its 
own supremacy and that the courts are “bound by that instrument.”110 
The Constitution prescribes the manner in which judges will be consecrated. 
Article VI, clause 3, states that the judicial officers of the United States shall be 
bound by an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.111 Judges take this oath 
when they are sworn into office for the first time. In this way, the act of taking the 
oath converts a chosen person from lawyer to judge, whose responsibility it is not 
only to obey the Constitution but also to interpret and proclaim its meaning. The 
public acknowledges the exalted position of the judge in the routine ceremonies 
reenacted daily in the courtroom. All in attendance must stand upon entry of the 
judge or judges, whose entrance is announced by a designated person (for instance, 
“oyez, oyez, oyez” or “all rise”). In this gesture, the parties and the visitors 
acknowledge that the judge is L/lord of the proceedings. Indeed, the parties present 
their pleas for relief to the court in the form of “prayers.” The courtroom is a 
sanctuary, and the judge its high priest. 
 
2.  Beliefs 
 
Durkheim states that people conceive two separate classifications for beliefs, 
whether real or ideal: the sacred and the profane.112 “Beliefs, myths, dogmas, and 
 
106 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
107 Id. at 176 (“That the people have an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, 
is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this 
original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The 
principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from 
which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.”). 
108 Id. at 177. 
109 Id. at 178. 
110 Id. at 180 (“[I]n declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution 
itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which 
shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the particular 
phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, 
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution 
is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”). 
111 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). 
112 Id. DURKHEIM, supra note 69, at 34. 
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legends are either representations or systems of representations that express the 
nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers attributed to them, their history, and 
their relationships with one another as well as with profane things.”113 Sacred things 
are not limited to gods or spirits—they can be anything that people endow with value 
and protect from things not sacred. The profane is anything that threatens the sacred; 
prohibitions must be applied to the profane, and the sacred must be protected from 
it.114 There is a sense that the profane can contaminate or damage the sacred. The 
sacred is superior in dignity and power to profane things.115 The difference between 
the sacred and the profane is absolute. A void separates them, with no mingling 
possible.116 They are hostile and jealous rivals—two worlds with nothing in 
common.117 This rivalry is “expressed outwardly by a visible sign that permits ready 
recognition of this classification, wherever it exists.”118 
By compromising on the issue of slavery in the Constitution, the Founders 
established the belief system of the Religion of Race. In essence, they sacralized 
whiteness and made Blackness profane.119 The Constitution ordains the preferential 
treatment of whites over Blacks with the provisions maintaining and supporting 
Black subjugation, namely the Three-Fifths Compromise, the Slave Importation 
Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause, as well as the various supplemental 
provisions supporting these clauses or preventing the amendment of them.120 
Further, the Tenth Amendment, adopted in 1791, “reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people” the powers not delegated to the national government 
by the Constitution “nor prohibited by it to the States. . . .”121 As such, the 
Constitution affirmed the definition of slaves as property and persons under the 
various state slave codes. Taken together, these provisions established Black people 
as less than human beings, not deserving of the same treatment and rights as white 
people, with whites exercising control over the mind, body, and soul of Black 
people. Blacks are to be used for the economic success of other people and sacrificed 
for the wealth of the nation.   
The overarching goal of creating the Constitution was the creation of a new 
nation. The new nation was desirable for economic benefits and defense against 
foreign enemies. The debates during the Constitutional Convention show how the 
northern delegates valued the possible wealth of the new nation over their own 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 38. 
115 Id. at 35. 
116 Id. at 36–7. 
117 Id. at 36–7. 
118 Id. at 37. 
119 Blackness refers to the physiology, culture, and lived experience of people arriving 
in America directly from Africa or descending from persons who did. Whiteness refers in a 
broad sense to American culture based on the dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
perspective, to which all other cultures should assimilate. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 
“Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1991).  
120 See supra Part I for a full discussion. 
121 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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ideals, which argued against slavery.122 The discussions during the ratification 
debate also demonstrate that the state leaders were aware that they were trading on 
the principles of the new republic in order to achieve the goal of nationhood.123 They 
were sacrificing the liberty and equality of Blacks to ensure the success of the new 
nation.124 The representatives from South Carolina explicitly stated that without 
slaves, the state would falter.125 They needed Blacks to achieve their goals. Other 
delegates noted their own discomfort and outright repugnance with slavery but were 
willing to live with the hypocrisy in order to form a national government.126 The 
delegates were also willing to risk the wrath of God for the promise of untold 
wealth.127 Blacks were condemned as property to benefit the economy of the nation 
and, by extension, the wealth of whites. 
Blacks were so debased that they were not mentioned by name in the 
Constitution. It does not use the word “slave” or “slavery” in any of its provisions. 
The words were avoided to make the document more agreeable to delegates from 
northern states.128 Or, as James Iredell said at the ratifying convention, “the word 
slave is not mentioned . . . owing to the [northern delegates’] particular scruples on 
the subject of slavery.”129 This type of circumlocution is evident in the Three-Fifths 
Compromise, where slaves are referred to as “all other persons.”130 This euphemism 
continues in the Slave Importation Clause, which refers to slaves and the slave trade 
as “The Migration or Importation of such Persons.”131 The Fugitive Slave Clause 
refers to slaves as a “Person held to Service or Labour in one State.”132 The use of 
other words and phrases as euphemisms for slavery was a way for the southern 
delegates to appease their counterparts in order to receive the protection of slavery 
they sought.133 Essentially, the Founders, who may have had qualms about the 
institution, accepted the oppression of Blacks as long as what was written in law did 
not directly support the oppression (that is, as long as it sounded good on paper). As 
Luther Martin stated, the drafters used language to avoid words “odious to the ears 
of Americans,” although they were willing to allow the acts.134 This practice created 
 
122 WIECEK, supra note 45, at 73.  
123 See supra Part I.B. 
124 Id. 
125 Debate in South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 16–17, 1788) [Elliot], in 
3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 287. 
126 See supra Part I.B; supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra Part I. 
128 FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 3. 
129 James Iredell, Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788) [Elliot], in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 526 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2000). 
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
131 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
132 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3. 
133 FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 36, at 3. 
134 Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 58, at 285. 
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dangerous precedence for Americans to accept the suppression and subordination of 
Black people as long as the subordination did not sound as bad as it was in reality. 
Whiteness is sacred because whiteness means freedom. As Professor Cheryl 
Harris states, “[w]hiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, the property of free 
human beings . . . .”135 As the Three-Fifths Compromise makes clear, in America, 
there are “free persons” and “all other persons.”136 In other words, there are whites 
who are free and Blacks who are not. These are the polar constructs of “slave” and 
“free,” “Black” and “white.”137 Harris continues: “white identity and whiteness were 
sources of privilege and protection; their absence meant being the object of 
property.”138 Whiteness means the exclusion and subordination of Blacks.139 
Further, as Neil Gotanda notes, “Black is the reification of subordination; white is 
the reification of privilege and super-ordination.”140 Under the Durkheim construct, 
the sacred is superior in dignity and power to profane things.141 This precisely 
describes the nature of the relationship of whites and Blacks established by the 
Constitution, where whites are superior to Blacks. Whiteness is valuable because it 
confers citizenship and status as full human beings, which is denied to others.142 
Slaves were chattel property, and thus the mind, body, and soul of the Black 
person were controlled to protect the sacredness of whiteness from contamination 
by Black skin and Black blood.143 As mentioned above, the Tenth Amendment 
reserved to the states or to the people any powers not delegated to the national 
government by the Constitution or prohibited by it to the states.144 The slave codes 
existing when the Constitution was drafted and ratified covered all manner of daily 
life for the slave and created a regulated society between whites and Blacks. In fact, 
the bulk of legislative acts or codes regarding slavery dealt not with the legal status 
of the slave but with the regulation of the rights of Blacks, the noncriminal policing 
of Blacks, and the law of slave crimes.145 The codes covered not only slaves but all 
Black persons, who posed a perceived threat to the “purity and safety of whites.”146 
 
135 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 6, at 276, 279. 
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
137 Harris, supra note 135, at 278.  
138 Id. at 279. 
139 See id. at 283. 
140 Gotanda, supra note 119, at 40. 
141 DURKHEIM, supra note 69, at 35. 
142 Harris, supra note 135, at 285. 
143 For a discussion of the transition of a Black person from indentured servant to slave 
as chattel property, see William M. Wiecek, The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the 
Thirteen Mainland Colonies of British America, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 258, 264–66 (1977) 
[hereinafter Wiecek, Statutory Law] and William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of 
Slavery in British North America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1777–78 (1996). 
144 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
145 Wiecek, Statutory Law, supra note 143, at 264–65. 
146 Id; see Dana Berthold, Tidy Whiteness: A Genealogy of Race, Purity, and Hygiene, 
15 ETHICS & THE ENVIR. 1 (2010) (discussing the representation of whiteness as pure). 
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Few codes outlined the positive rights of slaves,147 but many negatively or at least 
indirectly secured the rights of slaves.148 The laws proscribed cruel and inhumane 
treatment of slaves and mandated a bare minimum of clothing and food for them.149 
No aspect of life was too mundane for the notice of the law. Slave codes governed 
the sexuality of slaves, especially if white lovers were involved;150 the ability of 
slaves to hire themselves out to third parties for wages;151 the ownership of horses, 
cattle, sheep, and crops;152 the ability of slaves to read or write;153 and the type of 
clothing slaves were allowed to wear.154 Laws also proscribed the participation of 
Blacks in the militia and military service and the use of their testimonies in court.155 
Natural law is a set of principles based on the idea of natural rights possessed 
by people apart from the rights given to them by government or laws.156 Contrary to 
natural law, positive law is law explicitly acknowledging or defining rights.157 The 
language of the Declaration of Independence discussed in Part I above illustrates 
this distinction. The notion that all men have certain unalienable rights “endowed by 
their Creator” is an acknowledgment of natural law. These rights represent the power 
that a man has over himself. Such power emanates from a deity or from nature. On 
the contrary, the Constitution makes the allocation of power explicit and is positive 
law.158 It specifies the consensual ordering of power among men within a society. 
Each person sacrifices some of their natural law rights to form the social compact 
and has an obligation to the social order. The Constitution is a tangible expression 
 
147 For example, in South Carolina’s code of 1740 and Georgia’s derivative code of 
1755, Blacks could bring suit to test the legality of their enslavement. Wiecek, Statutory Law, 
supra note 143, at 265. 
148 Id. 
149 The effectiveness of anticruelty laws is questionable, however, as statutes and judges 
were predisposed to assume that an owner would not willfully damage his own property (it 
would not make sense to damage a capital investment). Id. at 265–67. 
150 See Gotanda, supra note 119, at 6 (“The ‘one drop of blood’ rule typifies this stigma: 
Any trace of African ancestry makes one Black. In contrast, the classification white signifies 
‘uncontaminated’ European ancestry and corresponding racial purity.”) See also Kevin D. 
Brown, The Rise and Fall of the One-Drop Rule: How the Importance of Color Came to 
Eclipse Race, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POSTRACIAL 
AMERICA 44 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2013) (discussing the social and legal distinctions 
between Black and white in the United States, including in regards to intermarriage and 
sexual relations). 
151 Wiecek, Statutory Law, supra note 143, at 267. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 268. 
155 Id. at 268–69. 
156 COVER, supra note 89, at 10. 
157 See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
38–63 (providing a treatise on the common law of England on the rights of persons, the rights 
of things, of private wrongs and of public wrongs, which has proven to be an indispensable 
tool for American jurists and lawyers). 
158 COVER, supra note 89, at 27. 
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of that compact and establishes a “natural law obligation to obey . . . the 
Constitution.”159 In this way, although natural law rights are retained, positive law 
has primacy. 
Slavery was contrary to natural law.160 It denied the Black man161 power over 
his own body and use of his labor. In fact, appeals to natural law were the tools used 
by antislavery groups for expressing moral doubt and concern about slave law.162 
The rights enjoyed naturally from God were denied and stolen from the Black man 
through slavery. All that was left were the rights and responsibilities delegated to 
the Black man by the white man through the positive law of the Constitution. For 
the Black man, the Constitution made positive law and natural law one and the same. 
By this maneuver, the white man became the god of the Black. 
 
3.  Rituals 
 
Rites (rituals) define and maintain the boundaries between the sacred and the 
profane. According to Durkheim, rites are rules of conduct that prescribe how 
persons must conduct themselves with sacred things.163 Rites are a way for the 
profane to become sacred.164 Rites are ways for individual believers to lose 
themselves in the group, whereby their personal identities are willingly subsumed 
by the group identity. The group matters more than the individual.165 Geertz suggests 
that rituals are ceremonies or cultural performances exhibiting beliefs to both 
worshipers and outsiders, with each group interpreting the performance 
differently.166 It is in rituals where the moods and motivations attached to sacred 
things (Geertz calls them symbols) are generated and reinforced by the 
worshipers.167 As these moods and motivations are reinforced, the individual 
perspectives of the believers fuse into a single worldview of the collective group. 
Given the nature of beliefs and rituals, religion is a phenomenon conducted by 
a group. According to Durkheim, “[r]eligious beliefs proper are always shared by a 
 
159 Id. at 28. 
160 Id. at 8. 
161 I am consciously using the phrase “Black man” here instead of a broader, gender-
neutral approach of “Black person.” Racism and the Religion of Race developed during a 
time of severe gender inequality when the laws and rules of society were dictated by men 
(one would be right to wonder whether sexism is its own form of a constitutional civil 
religion). Therefore, it seems more fitting to speak of the development of status and rights in 
terms of a man and not just a person. Also, I wish to pay tribute to Dred Scott and his tireless 
pursuit to be seen as a human being and respected as a man. This does not, however, diminish 
the fact that slavery also denied Black women agency, humanity and dignity.  
162 COVER, supra note 89, at 9. 
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definite group that professes them and practices corresponding rites.”168 Religion is 
an eminently social, collective thing.169 Beliefs belong to the group and unify it.170  
In the Religion of Race, the ritual is the adjudication of cases and controversies 
pertaining to the status and rights of Blacks in the nation. This adjudication 
confirmed the authority of the Constitution and reinforced the beliefs regarding each 
race. This is the Ritual of Law. Through decisions, the law maintained the 
boundaries between white and Black, the sacred and the profane. Each decision 
reinforced the specialness of white freedom and citizenship and defined the group 
identity for each race. Courts played an active role in determining who was or was 
not white enough to enjoy the privileges accompanying whiteness.171 This 
determination, in turn, consistently confirmed the worldview that Blacks were 
second-class persons (if any class at all) and were beneficial to the growth of the 
nation. Blackstone provides a well-known definition of “law”: “[a] rule of civil 
conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state commanding what is right, and 
prohibiting what is wrong.”172 Law is the ritual by which the Supreme Court, as 
consecrated personages, divines the Constitution to command the manner in which 
the races will maintain the sacredness of whites and prohibit Blackness from 
contaminating their purity. Each case, with its briefs, oral arguments, and written 
opinions, is a cultural performance for those inside the judiciary, for the other 
branches of government, and for the public at large.  
The Ritual of Law comprises several principles. Supreme Court justices 
interpret the sacred text using these principles as their hermeneutic, which is to say, 
through an interpretive lens.173 The initial principles used by the Court in the pre-
Civil War era were carried over from England and were adopted early into the 
American legal system.174 These principles are: (1) common law/stare decisis; (2) 
federalism; and (3) judicial review. The Ritual of Law requires consistent use of 
these principles by the Court in each decision it adjudicates. The ideas and concepts 
embedded in the Court’s decisions are concretized each time the ritual of 
adjudication is repeated. In this way, racism against Blacks is hardened as whiteness 
is continually sacralized. 
 
168 DURKHEIM, supra note 69, at 41. 
169 Id. at 44. 
170 Id. 
171 Harris, supra note 135, at 283. 
172 COVER, supra note 89, at 26 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 93). The supreme power Blackstone mentions, refers to the higher 
law of natural law and not the positive law of the Constitution; however, it is still a useful 
definition and important as established in the legal academy. 
173 See Rowland, supra note 105, at 876 (explaining hermeneutics as a discipline 
dedicated to the interpretation of human expressions). 
174 COVER, supra note 89, at 140. See generally James Henretta, Magistrates, Common 
Law Lawyers, Legislators: The Three Legal Systems of British America, in 1 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: VOLUME 1 EARLY AMERICA (1580–1815), supra 
note 30, at 555; Kathleen A. Keffer, Choosing a Law to Live by Once the King Is Gone, 24 
REGENT U. L. REV. 147, 157–59 (2012). 
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(a)  The Common Law and Stare Decisis 
 
The common law system depends on the inherited body of past decisions by 
judges.175 A judicial opinion is designed to persuade the parties and the world that 
the decision arrived at is just; that the evidence has been weighed; that the rules of 
law have been justly applied; and that the rules of law themselves have been fairly 
determined.176 As the past decisions of judges become controlling on future cases, it 
is thought that stare decisis (that is, precedence) produces certainty.177 The 
supremacy of the single tribunal of the Supreme Court lies in its uniformity in the 
interpretation and operation of the powers of constructing the law.178 By relying on 
precedence, the Court reduces the challenge of judicial caprice in the lawmaking 
process.179 
The mechanism of the common law is cumulative, in that a particular case 
builds upon the holding and decisions of the previous cases. It is also speculative, as 
it strikes new ground and teases out new interpretations of the Constitution. Each 
case decided in a particular area of law stands on the ground of previous cases while 
also adding its own mark on the law. 
 
(b)  Federalism 
 
The Constitution provides checks and balances on the power it delegates 
between the national government and state governments. Federalism, the 
distribution of governmental authority between state and nation, has several values, 
namely, efficiency, promoting individual choice by allowing citizens to move from 
one state to another depending upon the laws they prefer, encouraging 
experimentation in social and economic matters, promoting democracy, and 
preventing tyranny.180 
Maintaining the proper balance of national power and state power was the 
overarching concern of the Founders and the members of ratifying conventions.181 
The Court is tasked with ensuring that the exercise of power by the national 
government remains within proper boundaries. This is no easy task, as the 
boundaries often shift. 
 
(c)  Judicial Review 
 
Although judges were the arbiters of the law, their power was not unfettered. 
The basic principle of judicial review is that only the people are sovereign, never the 
 
175 See also “Common Law” in WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY: QUICK 
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government, and this principle implies that courts must implement only that law that 
was legitimately derived from the people themselves, not from the judges.182 As 
such, judicial review is an extension of popular, not judicial, supremacy.183 In the 
Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton postulates that judicial review is tolerable 
because the instrument, which gives the judiciary its power to check the work of the 
legislative and executive branches, also limits what judges may do.184 The 
Constitution is their master, and they may not act upon their own will. Instead, their 
job is to judge based on the wills of others.185 Eugene Genovese suggests that the 
“law acts hegemonically to assure people that their particular consciences can be 
subordinated . . . to the collective judgment of society.”186 It denies the right of the 
individual to take action based on private conscience when in conflict with the 
general will.187 It pits the morality of the law in question against the morality of 
obedience to authority.188 The judge may express the immorality of a law but must 
still apply the law.189 This is demonstrative of the Durkheim construct in which 
rituals tie individuals to the group and unify them. The individual sacrifices personal 
will for the benefit of the group. 
 
B.  The Development of the Religion of Race 
 
In the first hundred years of the nation, the Ritual of Law developed and 
strengthened the Religion of Race. Each new case regarding the status and rights of 
Blacks ritualized the sacredness of whites and the profaneness of Blacks based on 
the Constitution as the sacred text. 
Below is an analysis of the primary cases decided by the Supreme Court 
adjudicating provisions of the Constitution related to slavery and the status of 
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1.  Slave Importation Clause—Groves 
 
The case of Groves v. Slaughter191 indirectly involved the Slave Importation 
Clause. The case involved a prohibition on importing slaves into the State of 
Mississippi and whether a contract for the sale of slaves was valid.192 Although the 
case turned on state law, not federal constitutional law, the Court, in its opinion, 
acknowledged the Slave Importation Clause and noted that it was an exception to 
the power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause.193 In a nod to federalism, 
the Court also noted that it was a state’s decision whether to allow or prohibit the 
importation of slaves.194 Essentially, the Court confirmed the validity of the Slave 
Importation Clause and states’ rights regarding the institution of slavery.195 
 
2.  Fugitive Slave Law—Prigg and Van Zandt 
 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania196 involved the issue of whether states could prohibit the 
capture of runaway slaves in their state. In Pennsylvania, slave captors apprehended 
a Black woman believed to be a slave contrary to the law in Pennsylvania prohibiting 
the forcible removal of escaped slaves.197 The Supreme Court, led by Justice Story, 
ruled that this law violated the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution,198 which 
prohibited all states from creating laws impairing the ability of other states to 
apprehend slaves. Free states were prevented from lawfully assisting or protecting 
runaway slaves.199 More importantly, this decision laid the legal foundation for the 
presumption that all Blacks, even those in free states, had the status of slaves.200 
Even legally free Blacks were under constant threat of being captured and forced 
into slavery.201 Prigg declared that Blacks were not afforded the protection of the 
due process of law guaranteed to American citizens under the Constitution.202 
The Court’s analysis demonstrates the principles of the Ritual of Law. After 
stating the question presented, the Court notes the nature of judicial review and 
interpretation of the Constitution.203 Upholding the principle of federalism, the Court 
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says that the states may not add to acts of Congress.204 It then reviews the 
constitutional provisions regarding slavery and acknowledges the compromises over 
slavery made by the Founders.205 These constitutional provisions prevent nonslave 
states from interfering with property.206 The Court affirmatively states that the 
Constitution protects state regimes that authorize a “complete right and title of 
ownership in slaves, as property . . . .”207 This statement is notable, as it makes 
explicit what is implicit in both the Constitution, the Groves decision, and the 
Amistad decision208—the Constitution sanctions slavery. Because the instrument 
never uses the word “slave” or “slavery,” the Court exegetes and provides explicit 
guidance (although it is doubtful that there was any confusion on this point).  
The Court makes another significant assertion. Without the Fugitive Slave 
Clause, the nonslave states could have made laws freeing runaway slaves or 
instituting certain safeguards to protect free Blacks.209 However, because the 
Constitution mandated a duty and responsibility for all states regarding runaway 
slaves, the states could do nothing but acquiesce.210 The Court reaffirms the 
supremacy of the Constitution—once it speaks, it must be obeyed. Further, once 
 
204 Id. at 610–11, 618. 
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208 One of the first cases adjudicated by the Supreme Court regarding race was United 
States v. Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, which centered on the status of 
Africans who were found aboard a ship marooned in New York harbor in 1839.⁠ 40 U.S. 518 
(1841). Two Spanish citizens from Cuba on the ship claimed that the Blacks (forty-nine in 
total) were their slaves and, as such, were their property. Id. at 524. The Africans, represented 
by counsel, argued to the contrary. Id. at 519. They argued that they had been kidnapped and 
taken from Africa to Cuba illegally in contravention of laws against the slave trade. Id. In 
accordance with the terms of a treaty with Spain, the United States argued for the return of 
the ship and all cargo, including the Africans, to Spain as the property of Spain. Id. at 518–
19. The Supreme Court agreed with the evidence that the two Spaniards had committed 
fraud, and that the Africans were indeed free natives of Africa who had been illegally thrust 
into the slave trade. Id. at 562. The Court ordered the Africans to be given into the custody 
of the United States for return to Africa. Id. at 597. The essential part of the case turned on 
whether the Africans were taken directly from Africa or were legal slaves. Id. at 596. If the 
former, then they were human beings and not subject to the treaty with Spain, as that treaty 
“never could have intended to take away the equal rights of all foreigners⁠.”⁠ Id. If the latter, 
then, as slaves, they were property “to be included under the denomination of merchandise” 
of the cargo of the ship, and thus could have been returned as property to Spain. Id. at 593. 
This case was not the usual case involving the status of Blacks, and thus it did not 
employ the customary principles of law. Nonetheless, the Court’s holding is significant, as 
it sets a blueprint for the Court’s consideration of the citizenship and inclusiveness of Blacks. 
The Court acknowledged that Africans were people, and it was possible for them to have full 
protection of laws—but only if they were not previously designated as free labor for whites. 
Id. If marked for slavery before arrival in America, then their fate was sealed. Id. Blacks in 
America were presumed to be slaves. 
209 41 U.S. at 612. 
210 Id. 
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Congress has the power to enact a certain law under the Constitution, states are 
forbidden to enact their own laws on the same matter, especially if those laws 
conflict with federal legislative acts or alter the meaning of such acts. 
The Court in Prigg also notes that states cannot interfere with the property 
rights of owners in slaves, as their property, unless it is to police the slaves.211 The 
dual nature of the slave asserts itself. When property, slaves exist for the wealth and 
pleasure of their masters, and states must refrain from interfering with a person’s 
wealth. When people, fugitive slaves are criminals, and it is acceptable for states to 
do what they must to protect the health and safety of whites.  
The issue of fugitive slaves came before the Court again in Jones v. Van 
Zandt.212 Brought under a challenge to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, the Court 
repeated the holding in Prigg upholding the constitutionality of the act and the 
clause.213 Again, the Court noted the provisions of the Constitution and the history 
of its creation when acknowledging the primacy of property rights in slaves.214 The 
Founders compromised in the Constitution to protect states’ rights in slave 
property.215  
The case is notable for two reasons. First, using the principle of federalism, the 
Court states that the legality of slavery is a political question for individual states; 
thus, the Court was not to rule on this issue in accordance with prior case law (that 
is, Marbury216). Second, when reciting the history of the constitutional provision 
regarding runaway slaves, the Court says that the compromises of the Founders are 
“sacred compromises.”217 The Court reaffirms that the denigration of Black people 
was a necessary and vital component of the creation story of America and the 
Constitution. 
 
3.  Citizenship Rights for Three-Fifths Persons—The Dred Scott Decision 
 
The archetypal pre-Civil War case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, known commonly 
as the “Dred Scott decision.”218 The Dred Scott decision concerned the citizenship 
status of Blacks and implicitly interrogated the Three-Fifths Compromise—whether 
people considered less than a whole person have citizenship rights. Dred Scott 
served as a slave to his owner for a number of years in states and territories that 
prohibited slavery and bringing slaves into the territory. His master, Dr. Emerson, 
and his family brought Scott and his family to Missouri. Upon the death of Dr. 
Emerson, Scott and his family were given to the widow as part of the estate. Scott 
sued in state and federal court, claiming a right to freedom under state and federal 
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law. The case was complex, with a variety of issues spanning ten years.219 The 
central issue of the case, as posed by Chief Justice Taney, was whether a “negro 
whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,” can become a 
member of the political community such that he is “entitled to all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by [the Constitution of the United States] to 
the citizen?”220 Or, as Don E. Fehrenbacher restates it, can Dred Scott, as a free 
Black man, be regarded as a citizen of Missouri for the purposes of being eligible to 
bring suit in federal court under the diversity citizenship clause?221 
The Court definitively asserted that Blacks, freed or enslaved, were not citizens 
of the United States. They could claim none of the rights and privileges under the 
Constitution.222 This is so, according to Chief Justice Taney, because Blacks were 
considered “a subordinate and inferior class of beings,” “altogether unfit to associate 
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they 
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”223 As a separate class of 
persons, Blacks were not, and were never intended to be, included as “people of the 
United States.”224 Further, the Constitution treated Blacks as property, and it was left 
to the states to decide how to deal with the Black race.225 
Not all on the Court agreed with Taney’s reasoning. Two justices vociferously 
dissented, noting that several colonies treated free blacks as citizens before the 
Constitution was adopted.226 They asserted that free Blacks were indeed citizens of 
the United States. Justice McLean noted that “[a] slave is not mere chattel. He bears 
the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man.”227  
One of the most consequential decisions in the long history of the Court, Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, is notable for several reasons. As a procedural matter, the Court 
did something unusual when it decided the citizenship question. Although the 
question was raised in the lower court, neither party pled the citizenship issue in its 
filings to the Supreme Court. Despite this fact, however, the Court reviewed this 
issue and justified doing so on the grounds that the parties were bringing the whole 
record before the Court, and the Court, therefore, had the prerogative to revisit this 
issue.228 Once the Court ruled that Scott did not have standing to bring suit in court, 
the Court could have ended its inquiry into the matter and not opined on the other 
issues presented. It broke with its custom, however, and proceeded to answer the 
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other questions. It justified this decision by invoking the power of the appellate court 
to correct the judgment of the lower court.229 As the authority, it could break with 
its custom when deciding cases. 
Substantively, the Court used the history of the country’s founding to rule on 
the question of Scott’s citizenship. According to the Court, Africans were not 
considered citizens of America at the time of the drafting of the Declaration or the 
Constitution.230 They were never part of the political community at the founding and 
have always been considered inferior.231 In the Court’s view, it was unfathomable 
that Blacks were included in the term “citizen of the United States,” such that they 
could avail themselves of the privileges of the court system.232 
Further, the Court reaffirmed the Van Zandt holding that the legality of slavery 
is a political question, and therefore the Court was not able to consider it (thereby 
confirming the importance of stare decisis).233 Moreover, referencing federalism, it 
noted that the separation of powers does not allow states to confer U.S. citizenship 
upon people.234 This authority is reserved solely for the federal Congress. Using 
another previous decision, Strader v. Graham,235 the Court noted that the status of 
the slave depended upon the law of original residence and not the state into which 
he was brought. 
Justice Taney hoped this decision would squash the issue over fugitive slaves 
and the peculiar institution embroiling the nation in never-ending controversy and 
increasing division.236 He was sorely mistaken. Perhaps his hubris arose from the 
fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and his faith that, once the 
Court interpreted it, all debate would end. While the law was settled, opinions were 
not. Ultimately, the legality of slavery was indeed a political question that could be 
solved only by the politics of war. 
Many have questioned—both then and now—the Court’s judgment in this case 
and have stated that it was wrongly decided.237 Nevertheless, the Court used the 
Ritual of Law—stare decisis and federalism—to maintain the boundary between 
white and Black, the sacred and the profane. It maintained the belief that whiteness 
is sacred because whiteness means freedom. Scott was not allowed to enjoy the 
privileges and rights of positive law that would grant citizenship rights to people 
living and working within the United States. Instead, his rights were at the whim of 
first his master, and then the Court (comprising white men), thereby confirming that 
natural law and positive law were one and the same for the Black man. 
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C.  Developing a National Civil Religion 
 
With each adjudication, the Supreme Court inculcated the Religion of Race as 
a national civil religion. Returning to the concept provided by Bellah in the 
Introduction, a key ingredient of a civil religion is the way sacred things are 
institutionalized into the collective society.238 When adjudicating Black rights under 
the Constitution of 1789, the Court used the three principles of stare decisis, 
federalism, and judicial review to reinforce the sacredness of whiteness.239 The 
Court also reviewed the history of the Constitution as well as state laws, and 
considered the current social conditions of whites and Blacks as part of its decisions. 
Each adjudication reinforced the belief system. As lower courts and legislators later 
incorporated each decision of the Supreme Court regarding Blacks into their 
decisions and laws, the authority of the Supreme Court was reaffirmed and 
strengthened. This, in turn, lent ever more legitimacy to the beliefs about Blacks 
promulgated by the Supreme Court with each decision. 
This process of reinforcing and inculcating the belief system of the Religion of 
Race is best exemplified by the example of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Many 
landowners in the South felt that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was weakened by 
the Court’s decision in Prigg.240 Although the Court confirmed the constitutional 
requirement for all states to adhere to the Fugitive Slave Clause by not creating laws 
that freed or protected runaway slaves, the Court ruled in that case that Congress did 
not have the power to require states to enforce the federal law.241 This meant that 
while states could not interfere with the recapture of slaves, they were not 
affirmatively required to adjudicate fugitive slave cases in their courts or assist in 
the hunting or recapture of slaves.242 As there were few federal courts at the time, 
slave masters had to incur the cost and time of pursuing runaways slaves on their 
own or hiring professional slave catchers.243 Congress addressed the concerns of 
southern masters and legislators by enacting the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 as part 
of the Compromise of 1850.244 Essentially, the law created a national law 
enforcement system for the first time by providing for federal commissioners to be 
appointed in every county who were empowered to decide fugitive slave cases with 
the attendant power of the state to secure the return of runaway slaves.245 The law 
provided harsh penalties (monetary fines and jail time) for anyone aiding fugitive 
slaves in any manner, and it included a very low standard for evidentiary proof and 
little to no due process for the slaves and freed persons charged with escape.246 This 
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law was affirmed, albeit indirectly, by the Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth.247 
The belief that Black people are inferior and worthy to be chattel property owned by 
whites came full circle. The Supreme Court had affirmed the belief that Black people 
are chattel property to be owned by whites in Prigg.248 Legislators then strengthened 
this belief further by creating the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 to demand more 
forceful participation by all states and all people in the recapture of slaves, thus 
making the institution of slavery stronger.249 The Supreme Court then reaffirmed the 
belief of Black inferiority by confirming the 1850 law in Ableman.250 In this way, 
the authority of the Supreme Court and the Constitution was reinforced and, along 
with it, the belief about Black inferiority. 
Another key feature of civil religion is its ability to serve as a tool of social 
solidarity, one that unites and orients the polity around a set of beliefs. The best 
demonstration that the Religion of Race united and oriented society around the belief 
of white supremacy is, interestingly enough, the story of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century abolitionists. On the surface, abolitionists appeared to reject the notion that 
whiteness was sacred, as they called for the emancipation of slaves and the end to 
the institution of slavery. Abolitionists, however, were not a monolithic group. They 
held different ideas about the speed of emancipation, the nature of the Constitution 
and its provisions on slavery, the use of the courts, and the aftermath of 
emancipation.251 The last consideration is the most interesting difference. Until the 
end of formal slavery, some abolitionists believed in the total equality of the races 
and fought for rights for freed Blacks.252 A second group of abolitionists believed 
that it was abhorrent to keep another human being in chains, but they did not view 
Africans as their equal and were content for freed Blacks to be treated as second-
class citizens with restrictions on their liberty.253 Some of these abolitionists 
advocated for “colonization,” which would remove slaves from the country 
altogether and create colonies for them overseas.254 Some of the Founding Fathers 
ascribed to this belief (as did President Abraham Lincoln).255 The core idea that 
unites this second group of abolitionists is the belief that Africans were not fit to be 
in the same society as whites. Whiteness was still sacred. These abolitionists 
believed in the Constitution, even if they were disappointed with its proslavery 
leanings, and they were satisfied using the courts as a means for change. They were 
able to separate the status of Blacks as slaves from their status within society. They 
ought not to be in chains, but they also should not be one’s neighbor. 
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Although many abolitionists rejected the ideas of white sacredness and Black 
profaneness,256 the fact that many ascribed to them shows that a civil religion had 
taken root. The various groups of abolitionists in the 1800s all sought to end the 
practice of enslaving Blacks. However, they displayed varying degrees of 
repudiating the Religion of Race, demonstrating the power of this national civil 
religion to shape and guide beliefs—even those who fought against slavery still 
thought of whiteness as sacred. For Bellah, the unity provided by civil religion 
consists of an agreement to subordinate the nation to a set of ethical principles 
transcending the nation itself.257 Even as the nation was fraying over the issue of 
slavery, the specialness of whiteness was still a salient and ever-present principle.  
From the creation of the Constitution until the Dred Scott decision, the majority 
of the Court spoke and settled the law so that the belief about the profaneness of 
Blacks hardened. By the Civil War, the Religion of Race had developed into the 
national civil religion. Whether this national civil religion would continue was 
challenged in the aftermath of the war. 
 
III.  THE CONSTITUTION OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The Dred Scott decision was a catalyst, or at least a significant factor, in igniting 
the Civil War.258 It hardened the abolitionist and antislavery advocates’ stance 
 
256 One group of abolitionists not only rejected the belief of white sacredness, but also 
rejected the Constitution as a sacred text. The Garrisonians, named for their leader, William 
Lloyd Garrison, believed that the Constitution was a corrupted document. Garrison declared 
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required. Id. Garrison advocated for secession by the free states and individual repudiation 
of allegiance to the Union. Id. But see Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United 
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DOUGLASS 477, 478 (Phillip S. Foner, ed., 1950) (Douglass disagreed with his friend, 
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document that became corrupted because it was administered by slaveholders). 
Black abolitionists also rejected white supremacy and worked outside of the usual 
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directly to the public instead of legislators, as well as to build popular support by interacting 
with social organizations. Id. at 300. They ignited the advent of “immediatism” by 
demanding an immediate end to slavery and the granting of rights to Blacks. White 
abolitionists at the time relied on a strategy of gradual abolition, by which states would enact 
laws to free slaves over a period of time. See COVER, supra note 89, at 160. Gradualism was 
also a legal strategy that avoided broad legal attacks on slavery and its place in the 
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colleagues and became more militant with their calls for the end of slavery. 
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against slavery and was further proof of the “Slave Power” that had overtaken the 
nation.259 On the other side, proslavery apologists were emboldened in their 
intransigent belief that slaves were the most important property and that the 
prosperity of the South (and perhaps the nation) depended upon slavery.260 The 
election of 1860 heralded a new Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, and the 
fear among southerners that the federal government would begin dismantling the 
slave institution.261 The South seceded, and the Civil War began.262 Lincoln, a 
moderate abolitionist at best, began dismantling the institution of slavery with the 
Emancipation Proclamation during the war.263 In the war’s aftermath, Congress 
continued the work by enacting the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866264 
and Civil Rights Acts of 1870–75.265 I refer to all of these Amendments and Acts 
together as the “Constitution of Reconstruction.”  
These Amendments and ensuing legislation forever changed federal power by 
augmenting it to safeguard the civil and political rights of Blacks.266 By doing so, 
they changed the fundamental belief system of the Religion of Race. These changes 
attempted to redefine the entire belief system of the Religion of Race so 
fundamentally that they represented a complete rebuff to the Religion altogether. By 
elevating the status of Blacks to full human beings with the accordant rights and 
responsibilities of whites, the new Constitution attempted to reduce the inferiority 
of Blacks and remove the boundary that existed between the sacred and the profane. 
This resulted in the dissonance that continues today—namely, whether Blackness 
remains profane and whiteness sacred, and whether Blacks will achieve the same 
level of citizenship status, rights, and privileges as whites. 
This section details the Constitution of Reconstruction and discusses the 
Supreme Court’s exegesis of the new Constitution.  
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A.  Amending the Constitution 
 
In the Religion of Race, authority rests upon the sacred text of the Constitution, 
which was created to define and establish the new nation. While this sacred text has 
been amended many times, the amendments instituted in the wake of the Civil War 
were the most consequential for Black Americans and, therefore, for the nation. 
What follows is a description of the Reconstruction Amendments—the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
Civil Rights Acts of 1870–75. 
 
1.  The Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment formally ended the Constitution’s protection of 
slavery:267 
 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall 
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.268 
 
The Emancipation Proclamation (the “Proclamation”) began the work of 
ending slavery; however, more was needed for emancipation to affect every state in 
the country and become a permanent solution to slavery. Issued on January 1, 1863, 
after a preliminary proclamation, the Proclamation emancipated only the slaves in 
states rebelling against the United States.269 It did not free the slaves in states 
remaining part of the Union, including Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and 
Kentucky.270 Further, the Proclamation was enacted pursuant to the president’s 
military powers during war as commander-in-chief. Accepting the argument that 
slaves were property, Lincoln claimed the military authority to seize the property as 
part of the conquest of war.271 Many in Congress doubted that the Proclamation 
would remain law after the conflict was over. If not, then the South might be free to 
reinstitute slavery.272 The war, with the Proclamation, wrought military destruction 
of slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment brought its legal destruction.273 
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The Amendment was introduced in the House of Representatives by James M. 
Ashley, on December 14, 1863, a year before the war was over;274 a month later, 
John B. Henderson of Missouri introduced the same proposal in the Senate.275 It 
went through three debates in Congress, one in the Senate and two in the House of 
Representatives, before being passed to the states for ratification.276 The Secretary 
of State, William H. Seward, announced the ratification of the amendment on 
December 18, 1865.277 
The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment used the natural law principles 
advocated by abolitionists when declaring slavery (and involuntary servitude) to be 
illegal. For decades, abolitionists had argued for the country to return to the words 
of the Declaration of Independence in its proclamation that all men were equal.278 
According to Alexander Tsesis, “the Declaration of Independence established equal 
liberty as a key national aspiration,” but “[it was] an unenforceable policy that 
conflicted sharply with proslavery commitments.”279 “[A]bolitionists adopted 
natural rights principles from the Revolutionary generation but decried the 
Founders’ willingness to accept inequality for the sake of national unity.”280 
Abolitionist principles were influential during the Civil War, as a number of 
Republicans began to accept these principles and call for an eradication of slavery 
even before the war was over.281 In fact, a number of abolitionists became influential 
politicians in the Reconstruction Congress and played a significant part in drafting 
and passing the Thirteenth Amendment.282 
The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment were cognizant that they were 
amending the most venerated governing document. They did not want to be seen as 
overthrowing the Constitution.283 They chose language from older, national sources, 
namely the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,284 to honor the Founders while also 
moving the country beyond the terrible compromise the Founders felt they had to 
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make.285 The Northwest Ordinance was a “touchstone of antislavery 
constitutionalism” and “occupied an almost sacred place” in constitutional politics 
of the antislavery movement.286 Using the language of the ordinance embedded the 
Amendment with the call to natural law that was the hallmark of abolitionists. 
For some, the Amendment did not do enough to protect natural law rights for 
Blacks. The proponents wanted to “protect the civil liberties of all persons, whites 
and emancipated Blacks.”287 Their arguments were based on the “Lockean 
presupposition of natural rights and the protective function of government.”288 The 
institution of slavery destroyed the natural rights the Constitution was designed to 
protect, so abolishing slavery would secure these rights.289 As noted by Black 
antislavery advocates like Frederick Douglass, equality between the races required 
more than the abolition of slavery.290 
This idea was on display in the legislative debates. Eliminating “slavery” was 
clarified to mean not just removing people from chains but also destroying the codes 
that turned people into chattel. Further, the Amendment was meant to address the 
“incidents of servitude.”291 This phrase, first coined by Senator James Harlan of 
Iowa, referred to the disabilities that the Amendment was meant to address, as 
Harlan saw slavery infecting the privileges of citizenship.292 The Amendment would 
empower the federal government to prevent “human rights abuses.”293 As such, the 
Amendment would affect not just those who were enslaved but also free Blacks, 
who bore the incidents of slavery.294 Additionally, it would also protect whites who 
were terrorized for antislavery speech and actions prior to the war and northerners 
who were kidnapped, abused, and murdered while traveling in the South.295  
By calling upon natural law principles, the drafters of the Thirteenth 
Amendment were restoring God qua God for the Black man. The sacred text would 
acknowledge the inherent equality of Blacks while also acknowledging positive law. 
The interplay of natural law and positive law for whites would now be the same for 
Blacks. 
The enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment granted power to the 
federal government over civil rights—an area that had once been the province of the 
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states. By doing so, it forever altered the fundamentals of federalism.296 This was 
one of the biggest concerns expressed by the opponents. The Amendment gave the 
federal government power to affect more than just freeing forced labor.297 Several 
members of the Democratic Party expressed concern about placing Blacks on equal 
citizenship footing with whites.298 Blacks now “would be treated the same as other 
citizens in voting, holding political office, and serving on juries.”299 The supporters 
of the Amendment responded that Blacks “should not be barred from [political] 
participation because of racism.”300 Opponents were also concerned with the shift in 
relations between the federal government and the states.301 They regarded the 
amendment as an “impermissible assertion of federal power,” as Congress now 
could enact laws regarding public and private discrimination.302 
In the end, the Radical Republicans were successful, and the Amendment was 
adopted. It was the first change to the Constitution in sixty-one years. 
Unfortunately, this formal end to slavery did not automatically change the 
status of Blacks from noncitizens to full citizens with all attendant rights. Using the 
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress created the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 (the “1866 Civil Rights Act”)303 in an attempt to protect civil 
rights against state and private interference and prevent Black people from slipping 
back into slavery. In a direct repudiation of the Dred Scott decision, the Act declared 
all persons born in the United States to be U.S. citizens, without regard to race or 
color or previous conditions of slavery or servitude.304 Further, it explicitly granted 
all persons the same rights as white citizens, including contract rights, property 
rights, and rights to use and participate in the court system, and it stated that all are 
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by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. Id. 
§ 1.  
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“subject to like punishment, pains and penalties.”305 The Act also stated that persons 
who denied these rights on account of race, color, or previous enslavement were 
“guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction,” faced a “fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.”306 The Act was 
monumental, as it was the first time that United States citizenship was clearly 
defined. This law also demonstrated a “new relationship between the federal and 
state governments.”307 Before the Act, states had discretion about whether to prohibit 
discrimination in any of these areas. This was no longer the case.308  
Senator Lyman Trumbull, one of the drafters of the bill that would become the 
1866 Civil Rights Act and a drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, envisioned the 
Act as giving effect to the Thirteenth Amendment by securing to all persons within 
the United States practical freedom.309 The Amendment and the Act were 
appropriate means of safeguarding individual liberty decreed by the abolition of 
slavery, and he believed that without them, Blacks would be pulled back into 
slavery.310 Eric Foner notes that under the Act, “whiteness,” which was previously 
a boundary of exclusion (that is, sacred), was now a baseline of citizens’ rights—a 
standard to be applied to all Americans.311  
As with the Thirteenth Amendment, there is a natural-rights philosophy 
underlying the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Trumbull elaborated by noting that the equal 
protection provisions give full expression to natural rights, which must be protected, 
lest the purposes of civil society are frustrated.312 The Act was also concerned with 
equality of economic opportunity, which was noted as a vital function of the 
government.313 Although drafted with the end of slavery and its vestiges in mind, 
the Act was designed to protect all races.314 It was not limited solely to action by the 
state but was meant to capture the customs and traditions by which individuals 
discriminate against others.315 
 
2.  The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Acts 
 
With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
Blacks were emancipated and obtained rights of equality on par with whites. This 
status remained, however, a fact on paper, but not in reality. Soon after the end of 
the Civil War, states in the South began enacting Black Codes.316 The sole purpose 
 
305 Id. 
306 Id. § 2. 
307 TSESIS, supra note 270, at 15. 
308 Id. 
309 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 17. 
310 Id. 
311 Foner, supra note 255, at 70. 
312 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 18. 
313 Id. at 15, 21. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 15. 
316 BELL, supra note 219, at 46–47. 
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of the Codes was to curtail the freedom of the Black person in order to put Black 
people as close to slavery as possible.317 In addition to the Codes, Blacks (and whites 
sympathetic to Black rights or showing sympathy for the ideas of the Republican 
Party) were the target of unfettered violence meted out by spontaneous mobs or the 
Ku Klux Klan.318  
It was evident to members of the Reconstruction Congress that the promise and 
potential of the Thirteenth Amendment had yet to be realized. The solution was to 
enact the provisions of the 1866 Civil Rights Act into an amendment to guarantee 
that the citizenship rights so desperately needed by Blacks were concretized into the 
political community of the country and not subjected to the whims of the majority 
(which was the possibly fatal flaw of the 1866 Act).319 There were, moreover, 
concerns that Congress lacked the constitutional power to pass the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act, and therefore an amendment was necessary to enforce the guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights for all citizens.320  
The first and last sections of the Fourteenth Amendment read as follows:321 
 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.322 
 
317 Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court: Congressional 
Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the State Action Syllogism, A 
Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1386–87 (2008). 
318 BELL, supra note 219, at 48–49. 
319 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1389.  
320 Id. at 1390. 
321 While the second through fourth sections of the Amendment are important, most of 
the jurisprudence surrounding this Amendment concerns the first and fifth sections. Paul 
Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of 
Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2014) [hereinafter Finkelman, 
Original Intent]. 
322 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–5. Sections 2, 3 and 4 read as follows: 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied 
to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age 
in such State. 
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Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
 
The Fifteenth Amendment reads as follows: 
 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.323 
 
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments furthered the goals of the Thirteenth 
Amendment of putting Black people in positions of true equality and made 
permanent the goals of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.324 These Amendments addressed 
the more blatant disabilities for Blacks flowing from the institution of slavery.325 By 
furthering the goals of the Thirteenth Amendment, these later Amendments 
expanded the meaning of the natural-rights philosophy undergirding the Thirteenth. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by 
the states in 1868.326 The first line of the Fourteenth Amendment addressed the 
outcome of the Dred Scott decision.327 As mentioned previously, the Court in Dred 
Scott ruled that Blacks, whether enslaved or freed, could never be citizens of the 
United States.328 By stating that any person born in the United States is a citizen, the 
Amendment directly repudiates the Court’s decision. Next, the Amendment protects 
the privileges and immunities of United States citizens from encroachment.329 
Congress generally understood that this meant that “privileges and immunities” were 
all rights shared by all citizens of the United States, including those enumerated in 
 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, 
or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or 
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.  
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
323 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
324 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 35, 36. 
325 Id. 
326 Finkelman, Original Intent, supra note 321, at 1020. 
327 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1394. 
328 See supra Part II.B.3. 
329 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1394–95. 
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the Bill of Rights.330 Further, the Amendment protects these rights from being 
abridged by the states.331 The Due Process Clause of the Amendment is one of the 
most important provisions, as it removed “one of slavery’s most severe disabilities—
the slave’s legal incapacity to attack arbitrary action authorized or mandated by 
government.”332 The Equal Protection Clause furthered the protection noted in the 
1866 Civil Rights Act. 
Congress did not spend much time or energy debating Sections 1 or 5, the 
clauses related to citizenship, privileges and immunities, due process, equal 
protection, and enforcement.333 The supporters agreed that it would protect the “civil 
rights” of Blacks and other races; however, they did not universally agree on the 
substantive meaning of the Amendment.334 As Paul Finkelman notes, the idea of 
equality between the races was in flux after the Civil War.335 For instance, although 
Republicans agreed that Blacks should have citizenship, there was a discussion on 
whether citizenship meant enfranchisement for Blacks.336 Further, phrases such as 
“equal protection” or “privileges and immunities” were general ideas, but “no one 
completely described them, and no votes or reports assented or defined what they 
meant.”337 
The Fifteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in 1868 and ratified in 
1870.338 The denial of the right to vote on racial grounds was seen as an attribute of 
slavery, so the purpose of this Amendment was to strongly advance the goals of the 
Thirteenth Amendment by removing this badge.339 Republican critics noted that the 
Fifteenth Amendment did not provide broad guarantees of the right to vote akin to 
universal male suffrage.340 Michael Kent Curtis notes that they “presciently warned 
that the Fifteenth Amendment could be evaded by all sorts of methods that 
disenfranchised people on a basis other than race (literacy tests, for example)—but 
had the effect of disfranchising blacks.”341 
As with the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Congress enacted several civil rights laws 
pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to make explicit the 
guarantees of the amendments. The Enforcement Act of 1870 was aimed at 
 
330 Id. at 1389. 
331 Finkelman, Original Intent, supra note 321, at 1022. 
332 Id. This inability to protect against government action was clearly demonstrated in 
fugitive slave laws that did not grant due process protections to Black individuals accused of 
being runaway slaves. Freed Blacks—those never experiencing slavery and those formally 
emancipated—were always in jeopardy of being captured and thrust into the slave system 
simply on the word of slave captors, with no evidence or proof.  
333 Id. at 1022. 
334 Id. at 1026. 
335 Id. 
336 Id. at 1025. 
337 Id. at 1027. 
338 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1398. 
339 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 36. 
340 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1398. 
341 Id. 
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protecting the Fifteenth Amendment right to vote.342 The act reached both state 
actors and private persons interfering with another’s right.343 Using the authority of 
the Fifteenth Amendment as well as the Fourteenth, the Enforcement Act also 
reenacted contracting and other legal rights from the 1866 Civil Rights Act.344 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the Ku Klux Klan Enforcement Act)345 aimed at 
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against state actors and private individuals 
who used political terror to prevent Blacks and whites from enjoying their rights. It 
provided for a civil cause of action and punishment of private actors for criminal 
conspiracies to deprive persons of their civil rights.346  
Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (the “1875 Act,” and together with the 
Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the “Acts”) was the last 
attempt by the Reconstruction Congress to erase the last vestiges of slavery, which 
were racial discrimination in public places.347 The 1875 Act, proposed by Senator 
Charles Sumner, prohibited racial discrimination in juries, churches, and places of 
public accommodations.348  
With these Acts, Republicans overwhelmingly concluded that Congress could 
reach private conduct motivated by a specific intent to deprive people of 
constitutional rights.349 This belief was based on a variety of theories—equal 
protection, the Bill of Rights, protection of less textually explicit civil rights, 
guarantee of a republican form of government, and, in some cases, all of these.350 
What was clear, however, was that Congress could pass a national statute to address 
the private oppression and violence perpetuated against Blacks and others in 
attempts to deprive them of constitutional rights. 
The effect of the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts was a monumental shift 
in the political status of Black people, at least formally. The Amendments changed 
the Constitution and thus amended the sacred text. In summary, the Constitution of 
Reconstruction abolished slavery, granted citizenship to Blacks, granted the vote to 
Black men, ensured Blacks equal right to contract and property, ensured for Blacks 
all privileges accorded to whites, and allowed enforcement against the government 
and private individuals for any interference of these rights and privileges. The 
Constitution transitioned from one protecting slavery to one providing new light for 
the treatment of Blacks and their place in the political community of America by 
restoring natural law and the rights attendant to it. Blacks were no longer chattel 
property but fully human citizens, with all of the same rights and duties as other 
 
342 Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); see BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 
37–39. 
343 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1400. 
344 Civil Rights Act of 1870, §§ 16–18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). 
345 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
346 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 39. 
347 Civil Rights (Enforcement) Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). BUCHANAN, supra 
note 271, at 43. 
348 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 43. 
349 Curtis, supra note 317, at 1414. 
350 Id. 
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citizens. The belief of Black inferiority was to be replaced with the belief of Black 
equality. 
This new light of the Constitution of Reconstruction would need to be fully 
understood and interpreted. It was not long before the Supreme Court was asked to 
divine its meaning. 
 
B.  Supreme Court Interprets Amended Constitution 
 
Soon after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts, the 
Supreme Court was called upon to provide guidance and interpret the new sacred 
text. During this adjudication, the Supreme Court was dealing with the sensitivity of 
politics for the first time after the Civil War.351 It was their role to determine the 
exact effect of the drastic shift of the federal-state relationship and the beliefs about 
Black Americans.352 G. Sidney Buchanan speculated that the abundance of 
congressional legislation passed to raise Blacks to the status of legal equality of 
whites reflected a fear that the efforts of Congress would meet judicial opposition.353 
 
1.  Initial Cases 
 
Early cases demonstrate that the fears of many were well-founded. In The 
Slaughter-House Cases in 1873, the Court completely eviscerated the meaning and 
potential of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
refusing to use it to apply most of the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states.354 
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court declined to apply the Bill of Rights to the 
states.355 In its first iteration of the state action doctrine, the Court stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the federal denial of rights and that states still had 
jurisdiction over them.356 The Court did show a little mercy to the Amendments later 
 
351 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 60. 
352 Id. See also Maltz, supra note 266. 
353 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 60. 
354 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). See Wilson R. Huhn, The Legacy of 
Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. 
REV. 1051, 1052 (2009); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 624, 
627–28 (1994); and see generally David S. Bogen, Rebuilding the Slaughter-House: The 
Cases’ Support for Civil Rights, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1129 (2009) (discussing the effects of 
the Slaughter-House cases). 
355 See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (discussing how the 
first amendment only operates on the national government); Huhn, supra note 354. 
356 See James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) 
Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
385, 388 (2014) (“Jurisprudentially, Cruikshank may well have been the single most 
important civil rights ruling ever issued by the United States Supreme Court. It was 
Cruikshank, not the far more famous Civil Rights Cases, that first limited the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect only against specifically identified state violations, and not directly 
against private action.”). 
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when it upheld the constitutionality of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the fourth section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited 
the exclusion of Blacks from jury service.357 A few years later, however, it declared 
section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Enforcement Act unconstitutional in United States v. 
Harris.358 It thereby disallowed punishment for private conspiracies to deprive 
others of their equal-protection rights. Within eight years, the Court scaled back a 
few protections found in the new Amendments and the laws enacted pursuant to 
them. It left Blacks vulnerable to deprivation of rights at the state level and the 
interference of their rights by private individuals (for example, the Ku Klux Klan). 
These initial cases diminished the new laws but left them intact. The Court was 
not finished, however. It continued to limit the meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Its decision in two key cases described below best demonstrates its 
interpretation of the new Constitution. 
 
2.  Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1875—The Civil Rights 
Cases 
 
A few years after the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendment (and two 
short years after Harris), a challenge was brought to the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
which had been created pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.359 In the Civil Rights 
Cases, indictments were brought under the 1875 Act against different individuals 
who denied service to Blacks in various public accommodation settings, notably an 
inn, a theater, and a railroad.360 The jury at the lower court found in favor of the 
defendants, and the suit was appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of the legislative history and text 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.361 The Court then established the principle of state 
action and provided case support for it.362 According to the Court, the Amendment 
 
357 See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) and Ex parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339 (1879) (cases discussing the constitutionality of discriminating against Blacks 
so that they could not serve on juries); BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 69. See also Maltz, 
supra note 266, at 628–32. But see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879) (holding that 
the absence of Blacks from a jury did not in and of itself create a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause that a criminal defendant could challenge, even if such absence was 
systematic). 
358 See generally United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating a law which 
made it a crime for two or more persons to deprive any person or class of persons equal 
protection of the laws). See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 
35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275–76 (2010). 
359 BUCHANAN, supra note 271, at 43. 
360 U.S. v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 4–5 (1883). See Stuart Chinn, Race, the Supreme Court, 
and the Judicial-Institutional Interest in Stability, 1 J.L. 95, 134–37 (2011). See generally 
Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960) (discussing 
the adjudication of the Civil Rights Cases and various civil rights acts as part of the 
development of the concept of state action). 
361 Stanley, 109 U.S. at 10. 
362 Id. at 11. 
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provides a limitation on what a state may do to its citizens and is not concerned with 
the “individual invasion of individual rights.”363 Furthermore, the Court said the 
Fourteenth Amendment is for corrective action against the state and does not 
empower general legislation on the actions of individuals.364 It then considered the 
Act in terms of the Thirteenth Amendment and stated that denying public 
accommodation is not slavery nor a badge of slavery.365 The Court reached this 
conclusion by reviewing the history of slavery and describing the incidents of 
slavery.366 According to the Court, the Thirteenth Amendment is not about race or 
class but about slavery only, while the Fourteenth Amendment does address race and 
class but only in terms of what the state may or may not do.367 The Court clarified 
that discrimination against individuals by individuals was not in the purview of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply 
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the 
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or 
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters 
of intercourse or business.368 
 
For the reasons above, the Court found in favor of the defendants and declared void 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not 
provide authority for its passage.  
The dissent by Justice Harlan was notable, as it used the principles of law 
employed by the Court prior to the Civil War.369 As Taney had done in Dred Scott, 
Harlan considered the intent of the law and the constitutional provisions.370 He then 
asserted the nature of the separation of powers to argue that the Court should void a 
law only when it clearly is not in the legislative power of Congress.371 He described 
the history of the relationship between the federal government and slavery.372 He 
also used stare decisis to argue that the national government has the power to protect 
the rights conferred or guaranteed by the Constitution (citing Prigg and Dred 
Scott).373 Using these principles, Harlan would uphold the 1875 Civil Rights Act and 
provide relief for the discrimination faced by the Black plaintiffs based on the power 
conferred in the Reconstruction Amendments.374 
 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 13. 
365 Id. at 20–25. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. at 23–24. 
368 Id. at 24–25. 
369 Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
370 Id. at 26–27 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
371 Id. at 27–28 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
372 Id. at 28 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
373 Id. at 28–32 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
374 Id. at 32–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Maltz, supra note 266, at 633–35. 
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3.  Fourteenth Amendment—Plessy v. Ferguson 
 
The infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson begins with a Louisiana statute 
mandating railroad companies solely within the state to separate Blacks and whites 
by providing designated rail cars or areas.375 If the races are not kept separate, the 
law prescribes fines and imprisonment for individuals and employees of the 
offending railroad company.376 The petitioner, Homer Plessy, was of mixed race, 
believed to be seven-eighths white and one-eighth Black.377 When he refused to 
leave a white car on a train, he was forcibly ejected and imprisoned. He brought a 
lawsuit challenging the state’s law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.378 
The Court begins its analysis in the usual manner by discussing the 
Amendments at issue with prior case law.379 It restates the holding of the Civil Rights 
Cases that discrimination against Blacks is not a badge of slavery, but only an 
“ordinary civil injury properly cognizable by law.”380 The Court then counters the 
Thirteenth Amendment argument by saying a statute making a mere legal distinction 
between the races does not destroy legal equality.381 The Court repeats this sentiment 
when noting that the Fourteenth Amendment allows the distinction between social 
equality and political equality, while the Amendment is concerned only with the 
latter.382 Further, the Court states that separation does not imply the inferiority of 
Blacks.383 It then traces the separation of Blacks from whites under various state 
laws, particularly those known to be antislavery and more liberal, to argue that 
separation of races was acceptable.384 It notes that the question is whether the statute 
at issue is a reasonable one in view of the established usages, customs, and traditions 
of the people.385 
The Court continues the assertion that separation of races does not equate to a 
badge of inferiority. It states that the statute in question “stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority” only if Blacks choose to put that construction on it.386 
Further, legislation cannot overcome social prejudices—only “natural affinities” 
will result in equality.387 The Constitution is not responsible for putting the two races 
on the same plane.388 
 
375 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896). 
376 Id. at 540–41. 
377 Id. at 541. 
378 Id. at 541–42. 
379 Id. at 542. 
380 Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases). 
381 Id. at 543. 
382 Id. at 544. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. at 544–51. 
386 Id. at 551. 
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388 Id. at 552. 
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Here again, Harlan has much to say in a dissenting opinion.389 He frames the 
controversy as one where the state is putting restrictions on U.S. citizens.390 He 
argues that railroads are public highways, and he uses case law to support this 
assertion.391 He then discusses the Reconstruction Amendments and the Court’s 
adjudication.392 In a notable passage, he gives a real-world meaning to the statute at 
issue and states that it keeps Blacks from occupying the same car as whites.393 His 
argument is based on infringement by the state of personal liberty.394 He counters 
the Court’s argument about reasonability by stating that it is not for the Court to say 
whether a law is reasonable but to determine whether it is valid (again employing an 
argument based on separation of powers).395 He also counters the idea that law does 
not affect social relations. Instead, he believes that separating the races will 
profoundly affect the country, as it will lead to race hate.396 Finally, he offers 
counterarguments to the Court’s use of prior case law by noting that the cases 
discussed were made before the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments.397 In 
essence, Harlan argues, the Court is basing its decision on the “old light” of the 
previous Constitution and not the new light of the freshly amended one.  
 
C.  Dissonance Created 
 
The outcome of these cases is well-documented, as they instituted the dreadful 
era of Jim Crow and the doctrine of separate but equal, by which de jure and de facto 
segregation of the races became a societal norm.398 By interpreting the Constitution 
 
389 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Nathaniel R. Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The Road 
Not Taken—An American Tragedy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 972 (1996). 
390 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
391 163 U.S. at 553–54 (Harland, J., dissenting). 
392 Id. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
393 Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Every one knows that the statute in question had 
its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied 
by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons.”). 
394 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
395 Id. at 558–59 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
396 Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
397 Id. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
398 See William M. Wiecek, Synoptic of United States Supreme Court Decisions 
Affecting the Rights of African-Americans, 1873–1940, 4 BARRY L. REV. 21, 21 (2003) 
(footnotes deleted) (arguing that in the late-nineteenth-century cases, the Court “gutted the 
substance of the Civil War Amendments, while preserving their façade as far as the freed 
people were concerned. In this way, the Court supported the destruction of their rights and 
the imposition of apartheid maintained by the forms of law, backed by legal and extra-legal 
violence . . . [t]hese decisions were in synch with the dominant social and attitudinal trends 
of the era in matter of race. One way of thinking about American social and political history 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century is to see it as the time when a ‘Jim Crow republic’ 
was created: a nation dedicated to apartheid. The results of the Court’s decisions were almost 
wholly congruent with that end.”). 
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of Reconstruction in the manner they did, the Supreme Court not only disregarded 
the principles previously used by the Court but also instituted new principles that 
would endure to this day. The Court established the state action doctrine, which 
determined that constitutional inquiry should focus on whether discrimination 
occurred because of the state (that is, the government), rather than focusing on 
recourse against private discrimination.399 
As keepers of the sacred text, the Supreme Court has the purported 
responsibility to correct error when it sees it. It did just that when interpreting the 
newly amended Constitution. By enacting the three Reconstruction Amendments 
and Acts, Congress was granting (or, from their point of view, restoring) to Blacks 
the natural rights proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence for all people. 
Through this legislation, Congress was placing Blacks on the same level as whites. 
The legislators were restoring god or nature as the giver of rights, and not the white 
man. The Court did not fully accept these changes to the belief system at the core of 
the Religion of Race and corrected what it perceived as an error. It did so by 
maintaining the ascendancy of positive law over natural law. The Court could not 
completely override the will of Congress and reinstitute slavery, and thus eradicate 
the natural law rights of Blacks. The Court could, however, delegitimize the new 
rights to maintain control over Blacks and thus reduce the importance of their natural 
law rights. 
The next section explores further the dissonance between the ideals of the new 
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s adjudication of cases in the aftermath of its 
creation. 
 
IV.  DIS/CIVIL RELIGION 
 
The Constitution of Reconstruction was a turning point in this country. It was 
an opportunity for the words of the Declaration of Independence and the promises 
of the Constitution of 1789 to come to fruition. Instead, by maintaining the belief 
system of the Religion of Race, the Supreme Court blunted the opportunity for 
Blacks to be full and equal members of the community. This is not to diminish or 
ignore the fact that the Court has since progressed toward the ideals of the 
Constitution of Reconstruction and that Blacks gained more political rights in the 
last half of the twentieth century than previously experienced. However, the 
optimism inherent in the Constitution of Reconstruction has not been fully 
manifested, as evidenced by the current socioeconomic status of Black Americans, 
the continued drumbeat of racial discrimination cases brought by Black plaintiffs, 
and the disproportionate deaths of Black people at the hands of police officers.400 
 
399 See Peretti, supra note 358, at 275–76. 
400 Black Americans hold less than three percent of the nation’s total wealth, even 
though they account for 13 percent of the population. The median family wealth for white 
people is $171,000, compared with just $17,600 for Black people. Trymaine Lee, A Vast 
Wealth Gap, Driven by Segregation, Redlining, Evictions and Exclusion, Separates Black 
and White America, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive 
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This section explores the dissonance between the intentions of the 
Reconstruction Congress and the Supreme Court’s maintenance of the boundary 
between the sacred and the profane, leading to the creation of a contest between the 
promised new civil religion and the Religion of Race as a dis/civil religion.  
 
A.  The Promise of a New Civil Religion 
 
After studying more than sixty different slave societies throughout world 
history, sociologist Orlando Patterson concludes that there are three constituent 
elements of slavery, each centered on the power dynamic of domination and 
control.401 The first element is the extreme power and coercion used to bring slavery 
into existence and then sustain it.402 The second element is “natal alienation,” or the 
nature of the slave as a socially dead person who is alienated from all rights and 
claims from birth.403 As such, the slave does not belong to any community or social 
order.404 The third and final element is the status of slaves as dishonored—they have 
no honor because they have no power except through another person, the master; 
they are the “ultimate human tool” and “disposable.”405 These elements accurately 
describe the American slave system and provide context in helping to truly 
understand how the Constitution of Reconstruction was a revolution in the way 
people in this nation would relate to one another. 
Members of the Reconstruction Congress were very clear that they were 
dismantling the economic, political, and social system of slavery and elevating the 
Black person to full humanity.406 By creating three constitutional amendments and 
related acts, Congress was attempting to reverse the elements of slavery articulated 
so well by Patterson. By providing for punishment and consequences against the 
state, as well as individual actors, Congress was removing the systematic power and 
coercion used against Black people during slavery. There would now be recourse 
against those who would act against the will of the Black person. In addition, these 
amendments resurrected Black people from the socially dead and brought them into 
the fold as citizens with rights and claims. They were now part of the political 
community of America. They were no longer tools to be used by another person; 
now, because they had power against those who would take their agency away— 
 
/2019/08/14/magazine/racial-wealth-gap.html [https://perma.cc/4FTN-2WQ7] (quoted in 
Brief for Respondents at 46, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African-American-Owned 
Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009, 206 L.Ed.2d 356 (2020)). See also State of Black America 2018: 
Black-White Equality Index, in NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, 2018 STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 
REPORT: POWERING THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION (2018).  
401 ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 
INTRODUCTION (1982). 
402 Id. at 2.  
403 Id. at 5. 
404 Id. 
405 Id. at 10. 
406 See supra Part III.A. 
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Blacks had honor. These were the lofty ideals embedded in the Constitution of 
Reconstruction. 
In essence, this newly amended Constitution dismantled the belief system of 
the Religion of Race. Black people were no longer property but were acknowledged 
as human beings entitled to the same treatment and rights as whites. They would 
have control over their own mind, body, and soul. They would have rights to 
economic success by and for themselves, consistent with every other person’s ability, 
and would no longer be explicitly sacrificed for the wealth of the nation. Unlike the 
Constitution of Slavery, the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts do specifically 
reference slavery and race. The Thirteenth Amendment refers to “slavery and 
involuntary solitude.”407 The 1866 Civil Rights Act explicitly ensures that “citizens, 
of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude,” shall have the same rights and privileges “as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.”408 The Fifteenth Amendment ensures that the rights of all citizens 
will not be abridged “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude” 
(which echoes the enforcement provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which uses 
the phrases “on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude” and “by reason of his color or race”).409 By 
mentioning slavery and race, the Constitution of Reconstruction acknowledges that 
the oppressive institution existed and had a deleterious effect on a portion of the 
population. The Constitution of Reconstruction intentionally and clearly rejected the 
previous belief system and instituted a new one built on freedom and complete 
equality. 
 
B.  Supreme Court Maintains Boundaries 
 
Whiteness is sacred because whiteness means freedom. In a new world where 
slavery is outlawed, freedom takes a different form. No longer is it the absence of 
chains and the ownership of the fruit of one’s own labor. In a postslavery world, 
freedom is the full expression of rights as citizens—the ability to speak, transport, 
assemble, and transact business in the manner of one’s own choosing. In creating 
the doctrine of separate but equal, the Supreme Court limited the freedom of Black 
people and created physical boundaries to maintain the sacredness of whiteness and 
prevent the profane Black skin from contaminating those spaces. Segregation is not 
freedom. As Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. states, “[s]egregation . . . ends up relegating 
persons to the status of things.”410 Despite the attempts by the Reconstruction 
Congress to elevate Blacks to equal status with whites, Blacks were still objects to 
be maneuvered and controlled for the benefit of whites under Court-sanctioned 
 
407 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
408 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2018)). 
409 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. See also Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2, 14 Stat. at 27. 
410 George H. Taylor, Race, Religion and Law: The Tension Between Spirit and Its 
Institutionalization, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 51, 56 n.35 (2006) 
(quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 85 (1964)). 
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segregation. As noted previously, Durkheim suggests that sacred things can be 
anything that people endow with value and protect from things not sacred.411 In a 
real sense, the profane can contaminate or damage the sacred. The sacred is superior 
in dignity and power to profane things.412 In the Religion of Race created by the 
Founders, then, value was defined by the rights and acknowledgment of citizenship 
attached to whiteness. Distance between the races maintained by power and coercion 
allowed for this value and uniqueness. Had the Court embraced equality, it would 
have removed the distinction between white citizens and Black people and, thus, 
removed the barrier between the sacred and the profane. Whiteness would have lost 
its value. The Court may have allowed for liberty (albeit limited), but it did not allow 
for equality. The Court was not willing to fully eradicate the Religion of Race at that 
time. 
Congress could have been a check on the Supreme Court when its interpretation 
of the sacred text was not in line with the ideals of the new Constitution. Congress 
represents the demos, the people, who voiced their will by ratifying amendments to 
the Constitution. Given the wide, sweeping changes Congress enacted with the 
Reconstruction Amendments and Acts and the passionate debates and speeches in 
favor of equality, one could suppose that Congress would amend the acts, if not the 
Constitution, to rectify the Supreme Court’s adjudication, which resulted in 
maintaining boundaries between whites and Blacks. Indeed, Congress has a history 
of correcting Supreme Court decisions, as demonstrated in creating the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 1850 to correct Prigg.413 Instead, Congress ceded control and remained 
silent. In fact, by the time of the Civil Rights Cases, it was clear that the federal 
government was unable or unwilling to halt the widespread violence against Blacks 
in the South during Reconstruction.414 In 1876, Republicans, tired of involvement in 
southern affairs, negotiated with the Democrats to ensure that the Republican 
nominee, Rutherford B. Hayes, would become the U.S. President.415 In return, 
Republicans promised that Hayes would withdraw federal troops from the South and 
not do anything when Democratic governors took office in several states of the 
South.416 This was called the Hayes-Tilden Compromise, and it had a destructive 
effect on burgeoning Black equality. Political rights were not protected, and the 
economic and social rights of Blacks declined as well.417 Reconstruction politicians 
were more interested in reconciling with white southerners than ensuring Black 
freedom.418 Congressional leaders were no longer committed to guaranteeing the 
promises of the Constitution of Reconstruction by 1883 when the Civil Rights Cases 
were decided, and definitely not by the time of Plessy.419 Thus, the decisions of the 
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413 See supra Part II.C. 
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Supreme Court went unchallenged, allowing its exegesis to shape the belief system. 
This exegesis meant there still needed to be a boundary between the sacred and the 
profane—between whites and Blacks.  
The Court and Congress both seemed to be invested in moving quickly beyond 
the effect and meaning of Reconstruction (and thereby delaying full equality for 
Blacks). The work of Norman Spaulding analyzing the evolution of federalism 
offers a useful explanation for these actions. Spaulding argues that the Rehnquist 
Court interpreted federalism according to principles established in the Constitution 
at the nation’s founding but diminished the important shift in federalism resulting 
from the Reconstruction Amendments.420 Spaulding posits that the Reconstruction 
Amendments are unlike any other changes to the Constitution and are a fundamental 
shift in its framework.421 The Amendments rectify the historical injustices of the 
original Constitution, namely slavery, and stand as a monument commemorating 
those injustices.422 The Court’s adjudication obscured this monumental shift and 
represented a “desperate desire to forget what defined the terms of Reconstruction 
before it even began.”423 Spaulding calls this desire to forget the “monumental 
historical consciousness,” and he defines it as collective memory work “predicated 
on forgetting the structural significance of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
Amendments.”424  
The analytical tool provided by Spaulding is helpful when considering the 
Court’s adjudication of Black rights after Reconstruction. Similarly, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged the changes brought by the new Reconstruction Amendments 
but continued to view relations among the races according to principles the Founders 
included in the original Constitution—the Constitution of Slavery. The Court 
diminished the effect of the Reconstruction Amendments by instituting the doctrines 
of state action and separate but equal,425 while generally curtailing the power of the 
Amendments to remove the boundaries between the sacred and the profane. As it 
did with federalism, here, too, the Court obscured the radical shift in the treatment 
of Blacks memorialized by the Constitution of Reconstruction. It was enough to 
 
420 Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, 
Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003). 
See also supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the impact of the Reconstruction Amendments on 
federalism). 
421 Spaulding, supra note 420, at 2026 (“[The Reconstruction Amendments] are 
structurally significant, marking a new constitutional framework, a radical break with certain 
first principles of the Founding.”). 
422 Id. at 2000 n.47 (quoting Robert Meister, Spaulding suggests that “in the aftermath 
of evil, liberal constitutions do not merely enshrine abstract principles of justice; they also 
memorialize particular histories of injustice”); Robert Meister, Forgiving and Forgetting: 
Lincoln and the Politics of National Recovery, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 135, 163–64 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999). 
423 Spaulding, supra note 420, at 2001. 
424 Id. at 2006. 
425 See generally id. (arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s recent revival of robust 
antebellum federalism principles turn on a chillingly amnesic suppression of the structural 
significance of the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments). 
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mark the injustices of slavery with the Amendments; the Court did not evince a 
desire to do the truly hard work of dismantling the belief system. As Spaulding might 
say, the Court’s desire to forget showed a “chillingly amnesic” suppression of the 
significance of the Constitution of Reconstruction.426 
 
C.  Dis/civil Religion 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War and the newly amended 
Constitution, the Court charted a path between the belief system of the Constitution 
of Slavery and the ideals of the Constitution of Reconstruction. Because the people 
had spoken and changed the sacred text of the original Constitution, the Court was 
beholden to the dictates of the prohibition of slavery and the grant of citizenship 
rights to Blacks. However, the Court curtailed the protections and gains promised in 
the amended Constitution by adding, for instance, the state action doctrine to the 
Ritual of Law. By doing so, the Court, as the consecrated personages of the sacred 
text, maintained the Religion of Race—with its belief in white supremacy. The Court 
transitioned the Religion of Race into a new form of civil religion, which I call the 
“dis/civil religion,” as explained below. 
Beginning with the Civil Rights Cases, the Court has used the state action 
doctrine to distinguish between public discrimination by state actors and private 
discrimination by private individuals. This distinction is based on the language of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the abridgment of equal protection 
under the law by the state.427 With this in mind, the Court has declared private 
discrimination to be permissible as a matter of constitutional interpretation.428 
Essentially, with the state action doctrine, the Court provided a private right to 
discriminate, as the doctrine requires the Court to examine the status of the actor to 
determine whether there has been state action in racial subordination—to wit, 
whether there was state action in positioning the rights and status of Blacks below 
those of whites.429 A state agent’s discriminatory actions may be determined to be 
nongovernmental acts and therefore protected private conduct.430 Neil Gotanda 
contends that “[u]nder this racial public-private distinction, public officials 
exercising state powers operate according to the rule that race is not to be considered. 
In the private sphere, however, race may be considered.”431 This is confirmed in 
 
426 Id. at 2036. See also Justin Collings, The Supreme Court and the Memory of Evil, 
71 STAN. L. REV. 265 (2019) (describing the engagement by the Court with the memory of 
slavery and segregation). 
427 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
428 Minnick v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 452 U.S. 105, 128 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(“So far as the Constitution goes, a private person may engage in any racial discrimination 
he wants.”). 
429 Gotanda, supra note 119, at 11–12, 14. 
430 Id. at 14–16 (referring to Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) 
and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) to note the “extraordinarily 
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Plessy, where the Court argued that it is not for legislation or the Court to put the 
races on equal footing socially, and the Constitution allows for social 
discrimination.432  
By limiting the application of the Reconstruction Amendments and Acts, as 
well as other civil rights laws, to actions by state actors, the Court maintains the 
boundary between whiteness as sacred and Blackness as profane. The status and 
treatment of Blacks are allowed to be subordinated to those of whites in private 
spheres. The public-private discrimination distinction is itself a boundary 
delineating when the sacred will be protected and when it will lose its value by 
mingling with the profane. This is proven to be problematic, however, as allowing 
there to be a sacred-profane distinction in the private sphere affects equality in other 
spheres because the application of rights is inconsistent. The Reconstruction 
Congress recognized and understood this problem and tried to eliminate all 
discrimination in all spheres by drafting the Amendments and Acts as they did.433 
By adopting the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court changed the Religion 
of Race from a civil religion into what can be called a “dis/civil religion.” As 
described earlier, Durkheim and Bellah posited civil religion as a tool of social 
solidarity to unite and orient the polity around a belief system.434 By sanctioning 
private discrimination vis-à-vis the state action doctrine, that solidarity is fractured, 
as the polity is now oriented around two discordant belief systems. The first is 
engendered by the Constitution of Slavery, the Religion of Race, where whiteness is 
sacred, and Blackness is profane. The other is engendered by the Constitution of 
Reconstruction, the promised new civil religion, where racial superiority is 
abhorrent, and equality governs.  
This fracturing accounts for the inconsistent and confusing adjudication of 
constitutional rights for Black Americans since Plessy. From that time until now, a 
large body of law has developed regarding antidiscrimination claims of Blacks and 
other racial minorities. The Court gradually dismantled the doctrine of separate but 
equal in several Court cases beginning in the late 1930s and culminating in the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, which overturned segregation in education.435 
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Brown technically invalidated the separate but equal doctrine only as applied to 
education;436 however, it was the fire that torched segregation in many different 
areas. After Brown, a series of Court decisions invalidated the separate but equal 
doctrine in public beaches and bathhouses, buses, parks, public parks and golf 
courses, athletic contests, airport restaurants, courtroom seating, and municipal 
auditoriums.437 Advances toward the ideal of the Constitution of Reconstruction 
continued with Blacks having full status and rights equal to those of whites following 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.438 However, after 
the civil rights movement, the story of civil rights is one of advancement followed 
by retrenchment, as several key legal victories were followed by narrowing the law 
or overturning and nullifying it altogether.439 
Critical race theorists and constitutional law scholars have noted the 
inconsistent and incoherent adjudication of Black rights since Plessy.440 For 
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instance, Justin Collings describes this adjudication as the Court’s engagement with 
memory regarding slavery and segregation.441 This engagement, according to 
Collings, results in the Court primarily viewing the nation’s past treatment of Black 
people as an aberration on an otherwise noble tradition of rights for all (termed the 
“parenthetical mode”). Because of this view, the Court often denies the redemptive 
power and authority of the Constitution as amended by the Reconstruction 
Amendments (as argued by Spaulding), resulting in a constrained expansion of 
constitutional rights for Black Americans.442 At other times, however, the Court 
operates in a “redemptive mode,” which does acknowledge the power of the 
amended Constitution, repudiates past wrongdoing, and sanctions strong judicial 
action.443 Thus, there has been an inconsistent adjudication in the Court’s history 
since Plessy.  
The Religion of Race as a dis/civil religion offers an explanation for this 
inconsistent adjudication. It is “dis/civil” because it separates from the redemptive 
power of the Constitution of Reconstruction. It does not fully embrace the 
dismantling of slavery and all of its related vestiges but seeks, instead, to create new 
rituals of law to maintain the sacredness of whiteness. It is not an “anticivil religion” 
because it still functions as a way to unite and orient society beyond mere political 
commitments.444 Despite this persistence, there are those on the Court, as well as 
outside the Court, who seek to dismantle the Religion of Race and fully embrace the 
promise of a new civil religion as attempted by the Reconstruction Congress. 
Essentially, the period after Plessy, continuing to this very day, can be seen as a 
persistent contestation between the dis/civil religion and the promised new civil 
religion. Any given session of the Court can see one of these civil religions ascendant 




This Article attempts to offer a framework to better understand the confusion 
and anger felt by many regarding the persistent nature of racism in America. Despite 
numerous laws and a robust regime for antidiscrimination, white supremacy persists. 
This Article tells the story of the nation’s foundational documents and ends with a 
discussion of the rocky start of the amended foundation provided by the 
Reconstruction Amendments. In future work, I will continue to explore the extent to 
which the Religion of Race is established in our law and society. This work will 
include a discussion on whether the Religion of Race can be disestablished and, if 
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so, the mechanisms and institutions (especially those beyond the Supreme Court) 
required for that to happen.  
In his dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan proffered the idea that the Constitution 
is colorblind. At first, this idea sounds laudable, as it was a counterargument against 
the doctrine of separate but equal. Upon further thought, however, the idea that our 
Constitution does not recognize color or race is problematic. The colorblind 
approach itself maintains the boundary between sacred and profane, as its 
application means there is never a chance to apply equity—programs specifically 
aimed at addressing the disparity between white and Black by privileging Blacks. 
The past few years have demonstrated that equality is not enough. Under the rubric 
of equality, the Court has been able to use colorblindness to perpetuate the 
subordination of Blacks. Having the same rights on paper does not equate to fair and 
affordable housing, access to healthcare, a criminal justice system that does not 
target Black people, and lasting wealth. 
Whiteness is sacred because whiteness means freedom. The Religion of Race 
is the national civil religion that subordinates Black bodies, Black minds, and Black 
souls to whites and white privilege. In a country that is becoming more diverse, and 
where nonwhites will become the majority in a few short decades, the central 
question is whether the Supreme Court will absolutely embrace the ideals and 
redemptive power of the Reconstruction Congress and firmly reject the racism 
established by the Founding Fathers. One hopes that the Supreme Court will seize 
the opportunity one day soon to fully dismantle this Religion of Race and 
successfully fulfill their duty as interpreters of that most sacred text—the United 
States Constitution. 
